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PRIVACY AND COURT RECORDS:  
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
David S. Ardia† & Anne Klinefelter†† 
ABSTRACT 
As courts, libraries, and archives move to make court records available online, the 
increased ease of public access raises concerns about privacy. Little work has been done, 
however, to study how often sensitive information appears in court records and the 
context in which it appears. This Article fills this gap by analyzing a large corpus of briefs 
and appendices submitted to the North Carolina Supreme Court from 1984 to 2000. 
Based on a survey of privacy laws and privacy scholarship, we created a taxonomy of 140 
types of sensitive information, grouped into thirteen categories. We then coded a 
stratified random sample of 504 court filings in order to determine the frequency of 
appearance of each sensitive information type and to identify relationships, patterns, and 
correlations between information types and various case and document characteristics.  
We present several important findings. First, although a wide variety of sensitive 
information appears in the court records we sampled, it is not uniformly distributed 
throughout the records. Most of the documents contained relatively few incidences of 
sensitive information while a handful of documents contained a large number of pieces of 
sensitive information. Second, court records vary substantially in the types and frequency 
of sensitive information they contain. Sensitive information in seven of the categories—
“Location,” “Identity,” “Criminal Proceedings,” “Health,” “Assets,” “Financial 
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Information,” and “Civil Proceedings”—appeared much more frequently than the other 
categories in our taxonomy. Third, information associated with criminal proceedings, 
such as witness and crime victim names, is pervasive in court records, appearing in all 
types of cases and records. Fourth, criminal cases have disproportionately more sensitive 
information than civil or juvenile cases, with death penalty cases far exceeding all other 
case types. Fifth, appendices are generally not quantitatively different from legal briefs in 
terms of the frequency and types of sensitive information they contain, a finding that goes 
against the intuition of many privacy advocates. Sixth, there were no overarching trends 
in the frequency of sensitive information during the seventeen-year period we studied.  
Although we found a substantial amount of sensitive information in the court 
records we studied, we do not take a position regarding what information, if any, courts 
or archivists should redact or what documents should be withheld from online access or 
otherwise managed for privacy protection. These largely normative questions must be 
answered based on a careful balancing of the competing public access and privacy 
interests. Nevertheless, we expect that this highly granular view of the occurrence of 
sensitive information in these North Carolina Supreme Court records will help 
policymakers and judges evaluate the potential harms to privacy interests that might arise 
from online access to court records. We also hope that scholars will draw on our 
taxonomy and empirical data to develop and ground normative arguments about the 
proper approach for balancing government transparency and personal privacy. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1810 
II. PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURTS AND COURT RECORDS ....... 1817 
A. THE RIGHT TO ACCESS COURT PROCEEDINGS AND 
RECORDS .................................................................................... 1817 
B. COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS ................................................. 1824 
1. Privacy and the Loss of Practical Obscurity .......................... 1825 
2. Navigating the Transition to Online Court Records ............. 1827 
III. A SENSITIVE INFORMATION TAXONOMY FOR 
COURT RECORDS ........................................................................... 1828 
A. THE CHALLENGES OF CREATING A TAXONOMY OF 
SENSITIVE INFORMATION ......................................................... 1829 
1. Building a Taxonomy on Debated Definitions of Privacy 
and Related Concepts .......................................................... 1829 
2. Charting the Piecemeal U.S. Approach to Privacy ................. 1832 
B. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THIS STUDY .............................. 1835 
1. Assets .................................................................................. 1837 
2. Civil Proceedings ................................................................ 1838 
3. Computer Use ..................................................................... 1839 
4. Criminal Proceedings .......................................................... 1840 
5. Education ........................................................................... 1841 
6. Employment ....................................................................... 1842 
7. Financial Information......................................................... 1843 
8. Health ................................................................................ 1844 
  
2015] PRIVACY AND COURT RECORDS 1809 
9. Identity............................................................................... 1845 
10. Images ................................................................................ 1847 
11. Intellectual Pursuits............................................................. 1848 
12. Location ............................................................................. 1849 
13. Sexual Activities ................................................................. 1850 
IV. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY .................................. 1850 
A. CORPUS OF COURT RECORDS UNDER STUDY ........................ 1850 
B. CODING AND ANALYSIS ............................................................ 1851 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ........................................................ 1853 
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ......................................................... 1853 
1. Sample Summary ................................................................ 1853 
2. Sensitive Information Summary .......................................... 1857 
B. ANALYSIS .................................................................................... 1861 
1. Variations Within and Among Information Categories ......... 1861 
2. Contextual Variations ......................................................... 1867 
a) Case Types .............................................................. 1867 
b) Adults and Minors .................................................. 1870 
c) Appendices ............................................................. 1872 
3. Temporal Variations ........................................................... 1873 
4. Regression Analysis ............................................................. 1877 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCESS POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES ........................................................................................ 1879 
A. IDENTIFYING WHERE PRIVACY RISKS ARE GREATEST ......... 1881 
1. Court Records Vary Substantially in the Sensitive 
Information They Contain .................................................. 1881 
2. Criminal Information Is Pervasive in Court Records ............ 1883 
3. Criminal Cases Have Disproportionately More Sensitive 
Information ........................................................................ 1884 
4. Minors Deserve Additional Attention .................................. 1886 
5. It Is Unwise to Focus Exclusively on Appendices ................... 1887 
6. Trends in Sensitive Information over Time .......................... 1888 
B. CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING PRIVACY 
PROTECTIVE PRACTICES .......................................................... 1889 
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 1891 
 APPENDIX .................................................................................... 1893 
  
1810 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:3  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts across the country are moving quickly to digitize their records 
and make them available online.1 Some courts are doing this work 
themselves, while others are relying on third parties, such as libraries and 
archives, to make public access possible. All, however, are dealing with one 
central and unavoidable issue: privacy.2 
Court records contain a variety of types of information that could be 
characterized as “private” or “sensitive,”3 ranging from social security 
numbers to the names of minor children involved in sexual abuse. In State 
v. Bright, for example, a brief filed by the State of North Carolina 
describes the abduction and rape of a ten-year-old girl, naming the child 
in full on the first page and continuing to identify her by first name on 
nearly every subsequent page of the brief.4 Similarly, in Dean v. Cone Mills 
Corporation, the plaintiff-appellant’s petition for discretionary review to 
the North Carolina Supreme Court includes an appendix comprising the 
plaintiff’s voluminous medical file and contains multiple references to his 
social security number, date of birth, and home address.5 
Little work has been done, however, to study how often sensitive 
information appears in court records and the context in which it appears.6 
 
 1. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 
(2014), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Future%20Trends%202014/2014
%20NCSC%20Trends%20Report.ashx (highlighting state courts’ efforts to move to e-
filing and the conversion of paper case documents into digital images); Paul H. 
Anderson, Future Trends in Public Access: Court Information, Privacy, and Technology, in 
FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2011, at 11 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2011) 
(reviewing the trends and issues relating to “an environment where most court systems 
maintain all or part of their information electronically”).  
 2. A wide range of technical and policy challenges continue to be a part of the 
effort to increase public access to court records, both in the context of electronic filing 
and in the digitization of older court records. But one of the central issues is privacy. 
 3. The terms “private” and “sensitive” in the context of personally identifiable 
information are not necessarily coterminous. As we discuss in Part III, there are no 
uniform definitions for these terms and their scope is widely debated by privacy scholars. 
For readability, we use “sensitive information” to refer to all types of personally 
identifiable information that might raise privacy concerns.  
 4. Brief for the State, State v. Bright, 505 S.E.2d 317 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998), disc. 
review allowed, 525 S.E.2d 179 (N.C. 1998), 2012 WL 6685334 (also submitted in full 
to the North Carolina Supreme Court).  
 5. Notice of Appeal and Petition for Discretionary Review, Dean v. Cone Mills 
Corp., 322 S.E.2d 771 (N.C. 1984). 
 6. One important study of court records was conducted by Carl Malamud using 
automated software to search a large sample of court filings downloaded from the federal 
court’s Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system. Malamud reported 
to the federal courts that a significant number of social security numbers and other types 
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The lack of empirical data hamstrings courts and archivists who are 
attempting to balance privacy interests with the public’s right of access, as 
well as scholars looking to adapt privacy law and First Amendment 
doctrines to deal with the flood of public records going online.  
This Article helps to fill this gap in our knowledge by analyzing a large 
corpus of court records from the North Carolina Supreme Court. These 
records are held by the Kathrine R. Everett Law Library at the University 
of North Carolina School of Law (“UNC Law Library”), one of several 
libraries with copies of briefs and court filings submitted to the North 
Carolina Supreme Court. Through sampling and content coding of briefs 
and appendices filed in cases decided between 1984 and 2000, we 
cataloged the types of sensitive information that appeared in these 
records,7 determined the frequency of appearance of this information, and 
analyzed the context in which it appeared.  
As is the case for courts and archivists everywhere, UNC Law Library 
personnel are grappling with the question of whether—and if so, how—to 
limit access to sensitive information that could cause financial, 
reputational, or emotional harm to individuals identified in the records. 
Although a patchwork of court rules, statutes, and government regulations 
provides some guidance as to the various categories of information that 
might raise privacy concerns, no studies address how often this 
information is likely to appear in court records, in what types of 
documents, and the specific context of its appearance.  
The results of our research are valuable for a number of reasons. First, 
this study provides a highly granular view of sensitive information in 
judicial records. Based on a survey of the laws that apply to court records 
 
of sensitive information were present in the downloaded files. See John Schwartz, An 
Effort to Upgrade a Court Archive System to Free and Easy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/13records.html (interviewing Malamud who 
states that he found several types of sensitive information in the downloaded case files); 
see also Letter from Carl Malamud to The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States 
(Oct. 24, 2008), https://public.resource.org/scribd/7512583.pdf (documenting 1,669 
unredacted social security numbers and other proximate sensitive information in records 
from 32 district courts). Computer scientist Timothy Lee followed Malamud’s report 
with a study that found some documents submitted to courts with intended redactions 
were not successfully redacted. Timothy B. Lee, Studying the Frequency of Redaction 
Failures in PACER, FREEDOM TO TINKER (May 25, 2011), https://freedom-to
-tinker.com/blog/tblee/studying-frequency-redaction-failures-pacer. Our study provides 
a similar, but more extensive, examination of North Carolina Supreme Court briefs and 
appendices.  
 7. We did not code for the appearance of sensitive information in the court’s 
decisions themselves. 
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as well as other privacy laws and scholarship, we have identified 140 types 
of sensitive information that may exist in court records. By coding for 
these information types, we are able to determine whether their frequency 
of appearance is correlated with case type, document type, or other 
contextual factors.  
Second, an understanding of the types and context of sensitive 
information in the North Carolina Supreme Court’s case files will help 
policymakers and judges evaluate the potential harms to privacy interests 
that might arise from the disclosure of sensitive information in court briefs 
and related records. Although this project examines only briefs and 
appendices filed in the North Carolina Supreme Court during a 
seventeen-year period, we expect that the results of our study will be 
generalizable to appellate court filings in many courts throughout the 
United States. 
Third, this research will have practical implications for court personnel 
and archivists as they develop rules and practices for electronic filing of 
court records or the digitization of older records. Based on our informal 
survey of archivists and law librarians around the country, we have found 
that digitization initiatives are proceeding without a clear or consistent 
strategy for addressing privacy concerns. This project will help to identify 
and support the development of best practices for courts and archivists 
developing or implementing redaction protocols or making other choices 
regarding access and privacy.8 
Finally, this research will be valuable to privacy scholars who can use 
our taxonomy and data to ground their normative arguments. Legal 
scholars, archivists, and law librarians have written extensively about the 
competing interests of government transparency and personal privacy. A 
number of these publications focus on court records, but little research 
provides empirical data concerning the frequency of sensitive information 
in particular types of court records. Although federal court rules require 
that some categories of information be redacted from court filings 
 
 8. All providers of court records face issues with regard to quality assurance, 
including data entry errors and other incorrect information. Courts and other archives 
that redact information face significantly greater quality assurance challenges. The results 
of this study should help to improve accuracy and reduce the cost of implementing 
redaction protocols, whether they are done manually (as the majority of such protocols 
are handled today) or through software. See Eric O. Scott et al., Text Mining for Quality 
Control of Court Records (Mitre Corp., Case Number 14-2510), http://mason.gmu.edu/
~escott8/publications/Scott%20et%20al.,%20Text%20Mining%20for%20Quality%20Control
%20of%20Court%20Records.pdf (presented at SemADoc 2014: Semantic Analysis of 
Documents Workshop, 16 September 2014). 
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submitted via electronic filing,9 and some states are following in the same 
direction,10 debate continues about how to address transparency and 
privacy in the context of e-filing systems and the digitization of older 
court records. This project supports discussion and policy shaping in these 
developing areas. 
The loss of “practical obscurity” lies at the heart of the debate about 
privacy risks from online access to court records. Although court records 
have historically been available to the public for review, the information in 
these records was for practical purposes obscure because the records were 
“stored in such an inaccessible fashion that only the determined and 
resourceful could obtain them.”11 Peter Winn was one of the first to 
examine the loss of practical obscurity with the advent of electronic filing 
systems, noting that online access provided significant public benefits but 
raised serious privacy challenges.12 Helen Nissenbaum and her coauthors 
 
 9. Federal e-filing rules now require redaction of several categories of data, 
including social security numbers and taxpayer numbers, dates of birth, names of minor 
children, financial account numbers, and in criminal cases, home address. See FED. R. 
APP. P. 25(a)(5); FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2; FED. R. CRIM. P. 49.1; FED. R. BANKR. P. 9037. 
 10. For example, since 2009 North Carolina has required e-filers to “exclude or 
partially describe sensitive, personal or identifying information such as any social security, 
employer taxpayer identification, driver’s license, state identification, passport, checking 
account, savings account, credit card, or debit card number, or personal identification 
(PIN) code or passwords from documents filed with the court. In addition, minors may 
be identified by initials, and, unless otherwise required by law, social security numbers 
may be identified by the last four numbers.” Second Supplemental Rules of Practice and 
Procedure for the North Carolina eFiling Pilot Project, Rule 6.3, N.C. COURT INFO. SYS. 
(Aug. 27, 2013), https://www.efiling.nccourts.org/manual/fiCourtRules.htm [hereinafter 
N.C. eFiling Rules] (referring to N.C.G.S. 132-1.10(d)). North Carolina also provides for 
non-parties to litigation to request removal or redaction of court documents available 
online for public viewing “if the document contains sensitive, personal or identifying 
information about the requester.” Id. at Rule 6.4 (referring to N.C.G.S. § 132-1.10(f)). 
An excellent review of access policies for South Dakota state court records was produced 
in 2005. See Lynn E. Sudbeck, Placing Court Records Online: Balancing Judicial 
Accountability with Public Trust and Confidence, INSTITUTE FOR COURT MANAGEMENT, 
COURT EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, PHASE III PROJECT (May 2005), 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Education%20and%20Careers/CEDP%20
Papers/2005/SudbeckLynnCEDPFinal32905.ashx (recommending full access for the 
courts and litigants and an electronic version for the public with sensitive information 
redacted); see also D. R. Jones, Protecting the Treasure: An Assessment of State Court Rules 
and Policies for Access to Online Civil Court Records, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 375 (2013). 
 11. Practical Obscurity, SOC. OF AM. ARCHIVISTS, http://www2.archivists.org/
glossary/terms/p/practical-obscurity (last visited Feb. 1, 2016); see also Woodrow Hartzog 
& Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4–8 (2013). 
 12. See Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and 
Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307 (2004) [hereinafter 
Winn, Online Court Records]; Peter A. Winn, Judicial Information Management in an 
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also have highlighted the chasm of difference between traditional in-
person public access to court records at the courthouse and Internet access 
through Google and electronic filing systems.13 Nissenbaum also 
articulated the importance of protecting information-flow norms 
threatened by disruptive technologies and practices such as the movement 
to make court records electronic and widely accessible.14 Others too have 
explored this tension of interests,15 and many propose that various types of 
information should be protected from broad exposure.16  
Archivists and law librarians also have noted the challenges posed by 
electronic court records and documented their own efforts to address 
privacy concerns while developing new projects to digitize court 
documents in order to expand and facilitate public access.17 For example, 
 
Electronic Age: Old Standards, New Challenges, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 135 (2009) 
[hereinafter Winn, Judicial Information Management]. 
 13. Amanda Conley, Anupam Datta, Helen Nissenbaum & Divya Sharma, 
Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to Online Court Records: A 
Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772 (2012).  
 14. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 
(2004) (concluding that social and practical norms regarding information flow are 
superior to formal bifurcations of information into categories of public or private). 
 15. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 
537 (2009) (suggesting privacy objections to highly transparent electronic federal court 
records should be addressed through removal of sensitive data and selective sealing of 
records and should not be used to shield the courts from scrutiny); Peter W. Martin, 
Online Access to Court Records: From Documents to Data, Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. 
REV. 855, 882–84 (2008) (warning that litigants are unlikely to adapt quickly to protect 
privacy, especially on behalf of non-litigants whose data may be in court filings); Will 
Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 
301 (2003) (“Digital technology is turning the asset of open government into a privacy 
nightmare. In the analog age, public records were all available, but languished in ‘practical 
obscurity’ in courthouse basements or isolated file cabinets.”).  
 16. See, e.g., Natalie Gomez-Velez, Internet Access to Court Records, 51 LOYOLA L. 
REV. 365 (2005) (recommending the use of protective orders and sealing to remove from 
public view high risk data elements and describing some states’ decision to exclude 
categories of court records from online systems); Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, 
Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet Access to 
Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921, 969–78 (2009) (recommending redaction of names 
of cooperating defendants and other informants while increasing transparency in the use 
of these law enforcement practices); Kristin A. Henderson, Lessons from Bankruptcy Court 
Public Records, 23 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. Q. 55, 73, 76–77 (2004) (evaluating the 
sensitivity of information provided in bankruptcy proceedings and supporting the 
American Association of Law Libraries’ proposal for redaction of sensitive information 
from bankruptcy court records accessible to the public through electronic case files). 
 17. See, e.g., Michael Whiteman, Appellate Court Briefs on the Web: Electronic 
Dynamos or Legal Quagmire? 97 L. LIBRARY J. 467, 470–77 (2005) (describing the need 
to preserve access to court records and discussing the challenges associated with 
protecting privacy, including the Northern Kentucky Law Library’s decision to refrain 
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the Montana State Law Library, which began scanning and posting 
Montana Supreme Court opinions and briefs in 1996, removed records it 
had already posted online to extract exhibits and appendices because the 
library found that these records contained a variety of sensitive 
information; the library ultimately reposted only the briefs with 
redactions.18  
The goal of this study is to inform these scholarly and policy 
discussions about the appropriate balance between public access and 
privacy in the context of court records. We begin in Part II by noting that 
court records present a special challenge for privacy advocates. Unlike in 
many other areas of privacy law, court records are presumptively open to 
the public. Part II describes the origin of the right of public access to court 
records and examines its scope under the federal Constitution, common 
law, statutory law, and court rules. As we note in Part II, not all 
repositories of court records are obligated by law to provide public access. 
For many librarians and archivists, the question is not what the law 
requires, but rather what is the best approach for ensuring the protection 
of privacy interests while at the same time informing the public about the 
functioning of the court system.  
In Part III, we survey privacy laws and privacy scholarship to create a 
taxonomy of sensitive information in court records.19 Based on this survey, 
 
from scanning appendices to briefs filed in the Kentucky Supreme Court). Archivists 
have been dealing with privacy concerns in a broad range of materials for many years and 
are considering how born-digital and digitized materials can be managed to address 
access and privacy. See, e.g., Christopher A. Lee & Kam Woods, Automated Redaction of 
Private and Personal Data in Collections: Toward Responsible Stewardship of Digital 
Heritage, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEMORY OF THE WORLD IN THE DIGITAL AGE: 
DIGITIZATION AND PRESERVATION: AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
PERMANENT ACCESS TO DIGITAL DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE (2012), http://ils.unc
.edu/callee/p298-lee.pdf.  
 18. See Tammy A. Hinderman, State Law Library Gets a 21st Century Makeover, 32 
MONT. L. REV. 6 (2007). According to Montana State Law Library reference librarian 
Tammy Hinderman, the library began providing online access to the Montana Supreme 
Court records in 2006, before realizing the records contained sensitive information that 
could facilitate identity theft and other privacy harms. Id. at 7. She explains that the 
library then removed all exhibits and appendices from the electronic version of the 
documents and redacted some information from the briefs before reposting them to the 
Internet. Id. In Kentucky, the Chase College of Law Library of Northern Kentucky 
University began its scanning of briefs from the state’s supreme court by omitting 
appendices, both to address privacy concerns and to limit the burden on the library. See 
Whiteman, supra note 17, at 477. 
 19. Taxonomies of sensitive information appear throughout the law of the United 
States and other jurisdictions, and electronic filing systems at both the federal and state 
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we identified 140 types of sensitive information that might appear in court 
records and grouped them into thirteen categories. Part III explains the 
justifications—and shortcomings20—of our taxonomic approach and 
describes the sensitive information types we coded for in this project. Of 
course, not everyone will agree with our taxonomy. That is to be expected, 
given that privacy is itself a contested concept. Nevertheless, the taxonomy 
has proven to be helpful to us in the identification of the privacy risks that 
can arise from the public disclosure of court records at a time when privacy 
laws have limited or unclear application to such records. Moreover, we 
think our extensive taxonomy will be useful to others who wish to 
understand the broad range of privacy interests implicated by public 
records. 
In Part IV, we provide an overview of our study design and methods. 
In short, we analyzed a stratified random sample of 504 court documents 
pulled from the briefs and other filings submitted to the North Carolina 
Supreme Court from 1984 to 2000. After performing content coding of 
the documents, we determined the frequency of appearance of each 
sensitive information type and identified relationships, patterns, and 
correlations between different information types and other coded variables, 
including trends over time. 
In Part V, we present a summary of our findings. We begin by 
providing descriptive statistical information about the court records in our 
sample and the sensitive information they contain. We then examine the 
extent to which different types of sensitive information are related to 
various case and document characteristics. Although we suggest ways in 
which our data can aid in the assessment of the privacy risks that might 
arise from public access to court records, it is not our aim to tell courts or 
archivists what information, if any, should be redacted or what documents 
should be withheld from online access or otherwise managed for privacy 
protection.21  
Instead, in Part VI, we discuss how our study can inform the debate 
about privacy and court records and how our results can help to identify 
and remedy some of the challenges courts and archivists are likely to face if 
they decide to implement procedures for addressing privacy concerns in 
 
level rely extensively on predefined lists of information types that must be handled with 
special care. See infra notes 89–98 and accompanying text. 
 20. Scholars have long criticized this approach because it relies on debated 
definitions of privacy, ignores contextual variations in privacy, and presents 
implementation challenges because of these definitional and contextual problems. We 
discuss these concerns and how we dealt with them in Part III. 
 21. We plan to address these normative questions in subsequent articles.  
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court records. We made several important findings in this regard. First, 
although a wide variety of sensitive information appears in the court 
records we sampled, it is not uniformly distributed throughout the records. 
Most of the documents contained relatively few incidences of sensitive 
information while a handful of documents contained a large number of 
pieces of sensitive information. Second, we found that court records vary 
substantially in the types and frequency of sensitive information they 
contain. Sensitive information in seven categories—“Location,” “Identity,” 
“Criminal Proceedings,” “Health,” “Assets,” “Financial Information,” and 
“Civil Proceedings”—appeared much more frequently than information in 
the other categories we identified. Third, we found that information 
associated with criminal proceedings, such as witness and crime victim 
names, is pervasive in court records, appearing in all types of cases and 
records. Information in the “Criminal Proceedings” category not only 
appeared in most of the documents we reviewed, but also appeared more 
often in those documents than any other category of sensitive information. 
Fourth, the data showed that criminal cases have disproportionately more 
sensitive information than civil or juvenile cases., with death penalty cases 
far exceeding all other case types. Fifth, we found that appendices are 
generally not quantitatively different than legal briefs in terms of the 
frequency and types of sensitive information they contain, a finding that 
goes against the intuition of many privacy advocates. Sixth, we saw no 
overarching trends in the frequency of sensitive information during the 
seventeen-year period under study. 
We close by providing some suggestions for courts and archivists 
seeking to manage sensitive information in court records. A number of 
practices have been introduced or recommended, including redaction of 
electronic records, redaction of both electronic and print records, removal 
of categories of court records from Internet access, and increased filing of 
court documents under seal. Our research will help courts and archivists 
evaluate these approaches.  
II. PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURTS AND COURT RECORDS 
A. THE RIGHT TO ACCESS COURT PROCEEDINGS AND RECORDS 
Public access to the courts has a long and venerated history in 
America, even predating enactment of the United States Constitution.22 
 
 22. See, e.g., Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (concluding that “[t]he existence of this right, which antedates the 
Constitution and which is applicable in both criminal and civil cases, is now ‘beyond 
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This openness serves many salutary functions, including ensuring that our 
system of justice functions fairly and is accountable to the public.23 As 
Chief Justice Warren Burger noted in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia:  
The early history of open trials in part reflects the widespread 
acknowledgment, long before there were behavioral scientists, 
that public trials had significant community therapeutic value. 
Even without such experts to frame the concept in words, people 
sensed from experience and observation that, especially in the 
administration of criminal justice, the means used to achieve 
justice must have the support derived from public acceptance of 
both the process and its results.24 
Public access also has been extended to many of the records associated 
with court proceedings.25 Access to judicial records plays a critical role in 
fostering public awareness about the operation of the courts because so few 
people are able to attend court proceedings in person and because most 
courts do not generally allow live or archival recordings. The movement by 
courts and archivists to allow online access to court records has made it 
possible for many more people to stay informed about the functioning of 
the judicial system.26 Online access also has a leveraging effect because it 
makes it possible for the media to cover court proceedings at a lower cost 
and allows for greater depth of reporting at a time when many media 
 
dispute.’”); Winn, Online Court Records, supra note 12, at 307 (noting that “the legal 
system has inherited from the Enlightenment a presumption of openness”); Conley et al., 
supra note 13, at 785 (observing that “the right to open courts and their records is actually 
as longstanding as our right to the courts and to justice itself”). 
 23. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (“Public 
scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the 
factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole.”). 
 24. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570–71 (1980). 
 25. The public’s right of access to court records is not absolute and may be restricted 
in some circumstances. See infra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. 
 26. See, e.g., Lynn E. Sudbeck, Placing Court Records Online: Balancing Judicial 
Accountability with Public Trust and Confidence: An Analysis of State Court Electronic Access 
Policies and a Proposal for South Dakota Court Records, 51 S.D. L. REV. 81, 91 (2006) 
(noting that a “frequently mentioned benefit” of electronic access to court records is that 
it responds “to the needs of South Dakota’s rural court users, that is, [it] ‘levels the 
geographic playing field’ by allowing persons located in great distances from the 
courthouse to access public information” (citation omitted)). Online access to court 
records also allows litigants, lawyers, and educators to scrutinize legal strategy and 
rhetoric. See Anna P. Hemingway, Making Effective Use of Practitioners’ Briefs in the Law 
School Curriculum, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 417 (2010) (advocating use of practitioners’ 
briefs to teach persuasive writing and legal analysis). 
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organizations are cutting back on the number of reporters assigned full-
time to the courts.27  
Although public access to court records is longstanding and deeply 
ingrained in our legal system, courts can—and often do—impose limits on 
public access. The First Amendment provides a right of access to court 
proceedings and to many records,28 as does federal and state common 
law.29 These rights, however, are not absolute.30 While the precise 
standard that a court must apply will vary depending on the source of the 
public’s right of access, in general courts must at least conclude that the 
interest in prohibiting disclosure outweighs the strong presumption of 
public access. In Nixon v. Warner Communications, for example, the 
United States Supreme Court instructed that “[e]very court has 
supervisory power over its own records and files” and that the federal 
 
 27. See Panel One: General Discussion on Privacy and Public Access to Court Files, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 13 (2010) (quoting testimony of Lucy Dalglish before the Privacy 
Subcommittee of the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on the Federal Rules). 
 28. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575 (finding First Amendment right 
of public access to criminal trials and noting that “[i]n guaranteeing freedoms such as 
those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of 
everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees”). Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly held that a First Amendment right of access 
applies in civil cases, most of the federal circuits that have addressed this issue have 
recognized such a right. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 
16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067–71 (3d Cir. 
1984). Courts have also applied a constitutional right of access to the judicial records 
associated with criminal and civil proceedings. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States 
Dist. Court. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Search 
Warrant, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988); Newsday LLC v. Cnty. of Nassau, 730 F.3d 
156, 164 (2d Cir. 2013); Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1074. But see Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 908 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (“With respect to 
the question whether the common law right to inspect and copy [discovery materials] has 
a constitutional dimension, we conclude that it does not.”). 
 29. See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (recognizing a 
federal common law right to “inspect and copy public records and documents, including 
judicial records and documents”); Richard J. Peltz et al., The Arkansas Proposal on Access to 
Court Records: Upgrading the Common Law with Electronic Freedom of Information Norms, 
59 ARK. L. REV. 555, 591–94 (2006) (discussing various state approaches). 
 30. When the right of public access arises under the First Amendment, “it must be 
shown that the denial [of access] is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, 
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 
U.S. 596, 607 (1982). When the right of access is merely a common right, courts have 
more leeway in denying access and can balance the presumption of public access against 
other interests, including the possibility of prejudicial pretrial publicity; the danger of 
impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency; and the protection of the legitimate 
privacy interests of litigants and other trial participants, such as witnesses, victims, and 
jurors. See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. 
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common law right of access could be denied when “court files might . . . 
become a vehicle for improper purposes.”31 Among the improper purposes 
the Court noted were uses “to gratify private spite or promote public 
scandal,” as “reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption,” and 
as a source of unfair competitive “business information.”32 Although there 
is considerable variation among the states, state common law rights of 
access also are typically qualified rights, allowing courts to restrict public 
access if an overriding interest supports closure or sealing of specific 
information. In California, for example, court records are “presumptively 
open to the public and [court proceedings and records] should not be 
closed except for compelling countervailing reasons.”33  
In addition to constitutional and common law rights of access, a 
number of state and federal statutes also provide a public right of access to 
court records. At the federal level, access to court records is governed by 
rules and policies promulgated by the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts on behalf of the federal judiciary pursuant to the Rules Enabling 
Act.34 At the state level, a variety of statutory authority provides for and 
impacts public access to judicial records. For example, every state has a 
public records statute, although not all of these statutes explicitly address 
access to court records.35 In those states that do have a public records law 
that covers judicial records, rights of access are typically governed by both 
the statute and court rules.36 
 
 31. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Pantos v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 198 Cal. Rptr. 489, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(citations omitted). 
 34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077. The Rules Enabling Act authorizes the Supreme 
Court to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for the 
federal courts. Pursuant to Section 2073 of the Rules Enabling Act, the U.S. Judicial 
Conference has established procedures to govern the work of its Standing Committee 
and its advisory rules committees. See UNITED STATES COURTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
ACT GUIDELINES, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 440 (2014), http://www.uscourts
.gov/file/2932/download. 
 35. See REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, OPEN 
GOVERNMENT GUIDE (5th ed. 2006) (providing summaries of public records laws in all 
U.S. jurisdictions), http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/index.php. When a state’s public records law 
is silent, the state’s highest court may define the scope and procedures for public access.  
 36. See, e.g., Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Colo. App. 1996) 
(interpreting the state’s public records law and court rules to hold that there is a strong 
presumption that all court records are open); Doe v. New York Univ., 786 N.Y.S.2d 892, 
899 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (applying both statutory law and court rules).  
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As a result, many states have multiple overlapping sources of law that 
require—and potentially limit—public access.37 In North Carolina, which 
is illustrative of the law in many states, public access is governed by, inter 
alia, a common law right of access,38 a constitutional right of access rooted 
in both the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article 1, 
section 18 of the N.C. Constitution, which states that “[a]ll courts shall be 
open,”39 and court rules that specify how court records are to be handled, 
including rules for electronic-filing.40 
Furthermore, the North Carolina General Assembly, through the 
state’s public records law (“NC PRL”) and other statutes, has both 
expanded and narrowed the public’s right of access.41 The NC PRL, which 
states that all state records “are the property of the people,” is applicable to 
every agency of the North Carolina government, including the judiciary.42 
 
 37. See Richard J. Peltz, et al., The Arkansas Proposal on Access to Court Records: 
Upgrading the Common Law with Electronic Freedom of Information Norms, 59 ARK. L. 
REV. 555, 591 (2006) (noting that “[s]ome states decided that only one type of law was 
necessary to adequately provide a right of access, while others applied multiple types of 
law to provide more depth to their access law”). 
 38. See Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 515 S.E.2d 675, 691 (N.C. 
1999) (observing that “[a]t least since 1887, this Court has recognized a common law 
right of the public to inspect public records”). As with the federal common law, the 
common law right of access in North Carolina is a qualified right. The decision to deny 
access “is left to the sound discretion of the trial courts, a discretion to be exercised in 
light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.” In re Investigation 
into Death of Cooper, 683 S.E.2d 418, 425 (N.C. App. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 39. Virmani, 515 S.E.2d at 692 (holding that the N.C. Constitution guarantees a 
qualified constitutional right on the part of the public to attend civil court proceedings 
and access court records). In the words of the North Carolina Supreme Court: “That 
courts are open is one of the sources of their greatest strength.” Raper v. Berrier, 97 
S.E.2d 782, 784 (N.C. 1957). 
 40. For example, N.C.’s eFiling Rule 6.3 states, in part:  
Except where otherwise expressly required by law, filers must comply 
with G.S. 132-1.10(d) to exclude or partially describe sensitive, 
personal or identifying information such as any social security, 
employer taxpayer identification, driver’s license, state identification, 
passport, checking account, savings account, credit card, or debit card 
number, or personal identification (PIN) code or passwords from 
documents filed with the court.  
N.C. eFiling Rules, supra note 10, at Rule 6.3. 
 41. See In re Investigation into Death of Cooper, 683 S.E.2d at 425; N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 132-1 (2015). 
 42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1(b) (2015) (“The public records and public 
information compiled by the agencies of North Carolina government or its subdivisions 
are the property of the people. Therefore, it is the policy of this State that the people may 
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The NC PRL does not grant court records any special dispensation from 
public access requirements, except to define two narrow exceptions to the 
law. The first exception allows for the withholding of settlements in 
medical malpractice actions against public hospitals.43 The other exception 
makes arrest and search warrants confidential until they have been 
returned.44 Various statutes outside the NC PRL also treat some court 
documents as confidential. These include records of grand jury 
proceedings;45 most adoption records;46 and reports of cases of juvenile 
abuse, neglect, or dependency.47 Other than these significant exceptions, 
almost all court records are subject to public inspection under the NC 
PRL unless otherwise specifically restricted by law.48  
Given this overlapping and sometimes ambiguous legal authority, it 
should come as no surprise that individual judges and court clerks 
frequently struggle with how to implement the public’s right of access to 
court records. As Amanda Conley, Anupam Datta, Helen Nissenbaum, 
and Divya Sharma note, “restrictions on access trickle down from state 
and federal appellate courts to the local courthouses themselves, where 
state and local law, custom, and in some cases simply the whims of court 
clerks determine which information in the court record will actually be 
made available to the public, and how.”49  
Moreover, librarians and archivists, who may not be bound by law to 
provide public access to court records,50 have an even broader range of 
 
obtain copies of their public records and public information free or at minimal cost unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law.”). 
 43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.3(a) (2015). 
 44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.4(k) (2015). 
 45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-623 (2015). 
 46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-9-102 (2015). 
 47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2901 (2015). 
 48. See News & Observer Pub. Co. v. Poole, 412 S.E.2d 7, 19 (N.C. 1992) (“[W]e 
hold that in the absence of clear statutory exemption or exception, documents falling 
within the definition of ‘public records’ in the Public Records Act must be made available 
for public inspection.”). 
 49. Conley et al., supra note 13, at 787. 
 50. The applicability of public records statutes to publicly supported libraries’ 
collections is not well established. Public libraries have been described as requiring 
autonomy to add and withdraw materials from their collections, at least in the context of 
First Amendment analysis. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 195 
(2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) (“To fulfill their traditional missions of 
facilitating learning and cultural enrichment, public libraries must have broad discretion 
to decide what material to provide to their patrons.”). State archives, however, tend to 
have statutory requirements for providing access to public records. See Carol D. Billings, 
State Government Efforts to Preserve Electronic Legal Information, 96 L. LIBRARY J. 625, 
626 (2004) (noting that “most state libraries that operate the depository programs and 
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options for dealing with sensitive information in court records. For many, 
the question is not what the law requires, but rather what is the best policy 
for ensuring the protection of privacy interests while at the same time 
informing the public about the functioning of the court system.51 As a 
result, some libraries exclude whole categories of records from public 
access,52 whereas others engage in targeted redactions of sensitive 
information based either on their own assessment of what is private53 or on 
the electronic filing rules adopted by their courts.54 Alternatively, several 
libraries have adopted a middle-ground approach. They provide mediated 
access to court records, allowing only bibliographic information to be 
discoverable on the Internet, not the contents of the records themselves,55 
or limiting access to unaltered briefs to registered library users.56 
 
state archives with responsibility for preserving records lack rule-making and enforcement 
powers to require compliance”).  
 51. See, e.g., Hinderman, supra note 18, at 7 (discussing the Montana State Law 
Library’s efforts to balance privacy and public access concerns); Whiteman, supra note 17, 
at 477 (describing the approach taken by Northern Kentucky University’s law library). 
Even if a library or other archive decides to make case files available without any 
restrictions on access, it should not face legal liability if the records contain information 
that violates privacy law. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) 
(“Once true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, 
the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.”). 
 52. See Hinderman, supra note 18, at 7 (describing the exclusion of appendices); 
Whiteman, supra note 17, at 477 (same).  
 53. The Montana State Law Library redacted social security numbers, dates of birth 
and other “obviously private information” from the briefs in its database of supreme court 
briefs. Hinderman, supra note 18, at 7. The Blakley Law Library at the Arizona State 
University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law has posted digital versions of state 
appellate and supreme court briefs to the Internet with the caveat, “Certain types of 
personal information may have been removed from briefs on the Arizona Memory 
Project to allow for online publication.” About Collection, ARIZONA MEMORY PROJECT, 
http://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/cdm/landingpage/collection/asuross (last visited May 31, 
2015).  
 54. See Faye Jones & Caroline Osborne, Lessons Learned: Creating Digital Collections 
and Privacy: Best Practices, Presentation at the Southeastern Association of Law Libraries 
Annual Meeting (April 16, 2015) (presentation slides on file with authors) (comments of 
Faye Jones, describing the Florida State University College of Law Library’s collaboration 
with other Florida law libraries to provide Internet access to state supreme court briefs 
and citing Florida public records laws (FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01–.15 as well as FLA. R. JUD. 
ADM. 2.420), which outline confidentiality guidelines for filing of court records including 
redaction). 
 55. Id. (comments of Caroline Osborne, explaining Washington and Lee Law 
Library’s project to digitize and not redact copies of Virginia Supreme Court briefs, to 
store the digital briefs in a “dark archive,” and to develop policies and procedures for 
responding to requests for individual briefs, citing state statutes on freedom of 
information (VA. CODE §§ 2.2-3700–3714), prohibition of posting certain information 
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B. COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS 
Court records contain a variety of information that can cause harm to 
individual, organizational, and governmental interests. A court’s file for a 
single case may consist of thousands of documents, including motions, 
pleadings, briefs, transcripts, exhibits entered into evidence, and records 
and responses produced during pre-trial discovery that have been filed 
with the court.57 For individuals, information ranging from social security 
numbers to sexual history can appear in these documents raising, among 
other concerns, the risk of identity theft and reputational harm.58 For 
businesses and other organizations, court records can contain trade secrets 
and other confidential information.59 For the government, information in 
court records such as the names of confidential informants and 
descriptions of intelligence gathering techniques can potentially harm 
national security or undermine law enforcement efforts.60 Although all of 
these countervailing interests are worthy of study, our focus is on the 
impact that the disclosure of sensitive information in court records can 
have on individuals. 
Given that “[t]he courts are a stage where many of life’s dramas are 
performed, where people may be shamed, vindicated, compensated, 
punished, judged, or exposed,”61 it is natural that court records, which 
 
to the Internet (VA. CODE § 17.1-293), and personal information privacy (VA. CODE 
§ 59.1.443.2)).  
 56. See Policies for Utah Court Briefs, HOWARD W. HUNTER LAW LIBRARY, J. 
RUBEN CLARK LAW SCHOOL, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, http://digitalcommons
.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2016) (explaining that 
briefs are “supplied to the Hunter Law Library by the courts for the purposes of legal 
scholarship and academic research. The Hunter Law Library provides this collection as 
authorized by the Utah Courts. The Law Library is not responsible for the selection or 
content of individual records.”). 
 57. See Conley et al., supra note 13, at 781 (noting that “[e]ach and every form filled 
out by the parties, their lawyers, or by related third parties (witnesses, jurors, etc.) 
potentially contains vast amounts of personal data including home or school addresses, 
places of employment, birthdates, and, in many cases, Social Security numbers.”). Some 
documents such as sealed discovery materials, see Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion 
Techs, Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 163–65 (3d Cir. 1993), and certain financial information 
about the parties, see United States v. Lexin, 434 F. Supp. 2d 836, 849 (S.D. Cal. 2006), 
are often excluded from the public court record. 
 58. See infra Part III. 
 59. See Kyle J. Mendenhall, Can You Keep A Secret? The Court’s Role in Protecting 
Trade Secrets and Other Confidential Business Information from Disclosure in Litigation, 62 
DRAKE L. REV. 885 (2014). 
 60. See Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 78 
(2010). 
 61. Conley et al., supra note 13, at 774. 
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serve as a chronicle of these dramas, are littered with private and sensitive 
information. In fact, they are full of information not just about the parties 
in a case, but also about witnesses, family members, victims, and jurors, 
among other individuals who are brought willingly or unwillingly into a 
legal dispute. 
Although concerns about private information in court records existed 
long before the Internet, many commentators see the move to electronic 
court records as effectuating a qualitative shift in the balance between the 
competing interests of public access and individual privacy. Not so long 
ago it was difficult and time-consuming to access and search an entire case 
file. Today, with the advent of electronic court records and online access, 
it takes little effort to find and link information across cases, courts, and 
states. The following sections highlight the most pressing concerns that 
arise from the transition to online court records. We then dive much more 
deeply into these issues in Parts III and VI. 
1. Privacy and the Loss of Practical Obscurity 
Courts, like other institutions in our society, are in the midst of a 
transformation. The largely paper-based world of the twentieth century is 
giving way to an interconnected, electronic world where physical and 
temporal barriers to public access are evaporating. Over the past decade, 
courts across the country have been moving with alacrity to digitize their 
records and make them available to the public online.62 Some courts are 
doing this work themselves, while others are relying on third parties, such 
as libraries and other archives, to make online access to historical records 
possible. A growing number of courts also require litigants to file their 
pleadings, motions, and other documents in electronic format.63 
 
 62. See John T. Matthias, E-Filing Expansion in State, Local, and Federal Courts 
2007, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2007, at 34 (highlighting state courts’ 
efforts to move to e-filing and the conversion of paper case documents into digital 
images), http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/tech/id/570; HON. PAUL H. 
ANDERSON, FUTURE TRENDS IN PUBLIC ACCESS: COURT INFORMATION, PRIVACY, 
AND TECHNOLOGY 11 (2011) (reviewing the trends and issues relating to “an 
environment where most court systems maintain all or part of their information 
electronically”).  
 63. See, e.g., Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records—from Documents to 
Data, Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855, 872 (2008) (“By the end of 2007, 
electronic filing was an option in nearly all federal trial courts and was mandatory in a 
large number.”); Eric J. Magnuson & Samuel A. Thumma, Prospects and Problems 
Associated with Technological Change in Appellate Courts: Envisioning the Appeal of the 
Future, 15 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 111, 114 (2014) (“By late 2012, all federal courts of 
appeals were using electronic filing (e-filing).”); Matthias, supra note 62, at 34 (reporting 
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As discussed in the previous section, court records have for centuries 
been open for public review. Yet the difficulty of actually accessing 
individual records—for example, traveling to the courthouse, identifying 
the relevant case, finding the sought after document, and copying the 
information—made the information in these records practically obscure in 
the sense that private and sensitive information could remain in the 
records without creating a significant risk of harm. Today, this practical 
obscurity is vanishing. Although the specifics of electronic access vary by 
state (and sometimes by court), in most federal courts and many state 
jurisdictions anyone can access a court’s electronic case database through a 
website interface.64 That interface typically provides the ability to search by 
party names, case type, keywords, and other information, as well as 
providing case-by-case browsing. If users wish to copy a document, they 
can usually do so by downloading it as a PDF file.65 
The loss of practical obscurity that has resulted from this nearly 
frictionless access to court records lies at the heart of the debate about the 
privacy risks arising from online access. The Supreme Court recognized 
the importance of practical obscurity in holding that rap sheets 
aggregating public—but difficult to assemble—information qualify for a 
privacy exemption from disclosure under the federal Freedom of 
Information Act.66 The Court stated, “Plainly there is a vast difference 
between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of 
 
that as of 2007, twenty-six states had adopted court rules enabling e-filing statewide or in 
at least one court). 
 64. Some courts charge for access, some merely require registration, while others do 
not require either payment or registration. 
 65. In jurisdictions that have public records laws that cover court records, a requester 
may even be entitled to a copy of a court’s entire case database, though some limitations 
might apply. See LexisNexis Risk Data Mgmt. Inc. v. N.C. Admin. Office of Courts, 776 
S.E.2d 651, 652 (N.C. 2015) (finding that the court’s Automated Criminal/Infraction 
System (ACIS) database was a public record under the North Carolina Public Records 
Act subject to a limiting statutory provision requiring requesters to secure a nonexclusive 
contract and pay for reasonable cost recovery). 
 66. U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 
U.S. 749, 762–63 (1989) (describing the view that aggregated information provides no 
more privacy harm than its discrete components as a “cramped notion of personal 
privacy”). It should be noted that the Court’s decision in Reporters Committee for Freedom 
of the Press did not address access to court records, but rather a request for access under 
FOIA to a database of criminal history information compiled by the FBI. Id. at 751–52. 
The standard for determining whether public access can be denied under FOIA is less 
demanding than the standard for restricting access to court records; all that the 
government was required to show was that disclosure “could reasonably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Id. at 756 (quoting 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(7)(C)). 
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courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the 
country and a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of 
information.”67  
2. Navigating the Transition to Online Court Records 
As a result of these and other concerns, court administrators, judges, 
lawyers, librarians, and legislators are in active discussion about how to 
navigate the transition to online court records.68 Privacy scholars have also 
been trying to influence this transition. Indeed, a number of legal scholars 
consider practical obscurity to be a stand-in for privacy interests and now, 
with the loss of this obscurity, are suggesting that courts and archivists 
should implement various approaches to obscuring sensitive information 
in court records.69 Other scholars also have explored the tension between 
privacy and public access to court records, with some recommending a 
substantial curtailment of public access through redaction of electronic and 
print records, restricted public access, removal of categories of court 
records from Internet access, and increased filing of court documents 
under seal.70 
Although important theoretical work is being done with regard to the 
nature and extent of the privacy interests implicated by public access to 
court records,71 we are only just beginning to develop a sufficient body of 
 
 67. Id. at 764. 
 68. See Conley et al., supra note 13, at 776 (noting that “public and internal 
deliberations over state access policies have remained actively in progress”). 
 69. See Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 11, at 41 (“Obscurity obligations would not 
aim to completely curtail information disclosure; rather, they would seek to minimize the 
likelihood of discovery, comprehension, or contextualization.”); Steven C. Bennett 
Pleadings, Privacy and Ethics: Protecting Privacy in Litigation Documents, 2 REYNOLDS 
CT. & MEDIA L.J. 25 (2012); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, 
Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137 (2002); Will T. DeVries, supra note 
15. 
 70. See, e.g., Gomez-Velez, supra note 16, at 431–32 (examining the decisions of 
some states to exclude categories of court records from online systems); Morrison, supra 
note 16, at 925–27 (recommending redaction of identifying information of cooperating 
defendants and other informants while increasing transparency in using these law 
enforcement practices); Henderson, supra note 16, at 76–77 (supporting the American 
Association of Law Libraries’ advocacy for redaction of sensitive information from 
bankruptcy court records accessible to the public through electronic case files). Not all 
scholars argue for restricting public access. See, e.g., Lynn LoPucki, The Politics of Research 
Access to Court Data, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2161 (2002) (arguing against selective restriction of 
access to court records to enable better empirical research about the courts).  
 71. See, e.g., Nissenbaum, supra note 14, at 136–38 (concluding that accepted social 
and practical norms for information flows are superior to formal bifurcations of 
information into categories of public or private); Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 11, at 
3–4 (suggesting that the concept of “online obscurity” is a critical component of online 
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research that examines the risks to privacy when court records are made 
available through the Internet compared with long-standing public access 
that was practically obscure due to the logistical barriers to access. 
Our present research helps to fill this gap in our knowledge. Empirical 
data about the frequency and context of sensitive information in the North 
Carolina Supreme Court’s files will allow policymakers and scholars to 
better understand and evaluate the range of privacy risks that can arise 
from online court records. 
III. A SENSITIVE INFORMATION TAXONOMY FOR 
COURT RECORDS 
Our project draws on the longstanding approach to privacy of 
identifying certain types of information that present risks of harm that can 
be reduced through restrictions on public exposure. Taxonomies of 
sensitive information appear throughout the law of the United States and 
other jurisdictions, and electronic filing systems at both the federal and 
state level rely extensively on predefined lists of information types that 
must be handled with special care.72 The use of sensitive information 
taxonomies is pervasive because they provide an attractive, seemingly 
simple solution, for balancing privacy and competing interests. Indeed, 
this approach to privacy is the basis of much of privacy law.73  
 
privacy and developing an analytical framework for use by lawmakers and courts); Solove, 
supra note 69, at 1176–78 (criticizing the “secrecy paradigm” in privacy discourse and 
suggesting that there is an “expectation of limits on the degree of accessibility” to public 
records). 
 72. See, e.g., HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2) (2015) (listing 
seventeen specific identifiers to be removed to “de-identify” personal health information); 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of such Data, art. 2, sec. (a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38, http://eur
-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=en (defining 
personal data). As Paul Ohm has noted, although many scholars have turned away from 
the list-based approach to privacy protection, U.S. law remains largely grounded in this 
model. Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1125–32 (2015). 
 73. See Ohm, supra note 72, at 1128–29 (“The great variety of regulations, law, 
technical standards, and corporate practices that have been implemented to protect the 
privacy of information stored in databases share at their core this unifying construct [of 
sensitive information.]”). 
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A. THE CHALLENGES OF CREATING A TAXONOMY OF SENSITIVE 
INFORMATION 
1. Building a Taxonomy on Debated Definitions of Privacy and 
Related Concepts 
The creation of a comprehensive taxonomy of sensitive information 
types is a challenge because privacy law and policy are not grounded in a 
coherent understanding of or approach to privacy.74 Moreover, some 
conceptions of privacy simply do not lend themselves to a sensitive-
information approach. In addition, disagreement about the proper role of 
related concepts of confidentiality, practical obscurity, and contextual 
privacy increases the difficulty of creating a taxonomy of sensitive 
information. 
One of the core problems is the lack of consensus about the underlying 
interests and risks that define privacy. Financial integrity,75 personal 
safety,76 non-discrimination,77 confidential access to professional advice,78 
 
 74. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 477–78 
(2006) (“Privacy is a concept in disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means. As one 
commentator has observed, privacy suffers from ‘an embarrassment of meanings.’”).  
 75. Identity-theft statutes prohibit the disclosure of data such as financial account 
numbers and PIN codes. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-113.20(b) (2015); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 266, § 37E(a) (2015). Data security breach notification statutes require that 
companies and government entities encourage individuals to monitor their accounts for 
tampering if sensitive data is not kept confidential. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65 (2015); 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2015). Gramm-Leach-Bliley mandates notice 
requirements to allow bank customers to opt-out of permitted sharing of some of their 
financial information. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2012). 
 76. Publication of location information can place persons, particularly police 
officers, cooperating defendants, and victims of stalking, in harm’s way. Grayson Barber, 
Personal Information in Government Records: Protecting the Public Interest in Privacy, 25 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 63, 77 (2006); Morrison, supra note 16, at 971. Some federal and 
state statutes offer privacy protection under limited circumstances to particular groups. 
See, e.g., Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g(a)(5)(B) (2012) (mandating the option for parents to opt-out from the 
publishing of student directory information); CAL. GOV. CODE § 6254.21 (West 2015) 
(prohibiting the posting of any elected or appointed official’s home address or telephone 
number to the Internet without written permission).  
 77. Although Federal EEO law does not require non-disclosure of protected class 
status, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, some employers 
have developed best practices for avoiding related questions in order to provide a defense 
that they could not have based hiring decisions on information they did not have. In 
effect, privacy works as a barrier to discrimination. See Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The 
Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” 
Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177 (2003) (arguing that a shift in the presumption of 
failure to hire for discriminatory reasons has occurred in favor of employers); Daniel J. 
Bugbee, Employer’s Beware: Violating USERRA through Improper Pre-Employment 
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and protection of intellectual development space for certain creative 
pursuits and for children are some of the interests protected under the 
umbrella of privacy law.79 Other concepts associated with privacy include 
autonomy, dignity, and liberty.80 Some of these privacy interests relate to 
rights against the government while others address privacy in the context 
of private relationships. In addition, although privacy is generally 
considered a personal interest, it is also advanced as an important benefit 
to society.81 
Another point of debate is the authority for defining privacy interests. 
Some approaches embrace the idea that privacy is a personal choice.82 
 
Inquiries, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 279 (2008) (discussing pre-employment inquiries under the 
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act which protects those 
who served in the military). 
 78. Evidentiary privileges such as the attorney-client privilege are designed to 
encourage disclosure by providing confidentiality. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.6 (1983).  
 79. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) provides protections 
for children in the online environment, including parental consent requirements before 
certain personal information can be collected from a child. Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-728 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 6501–6506 (2012)). Intellectual privacy is protected in state library privacy statutes 
and in the case of California, an e-reader privacy statute. California Online Privacy 
Protection Act (CalOPPA), CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2015).  
 80. Protections of some areas of personal integrity are recognized as constitutional 
freedoms from government intrusion, and this body or bodies of law are characterized as 
decisional privacy, information privacy, and/or liberty protections. See, e.g., Griswold v. 
Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the right of marital privacy was violated by a 
statute restricting the use of or provision of advice in support of contraception); Whalen 
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–599 (1977) (noting privacy jurisprudence recognizes at least 
two types of interests, avoiding disclosure of personal information and independence in 
making certain kinds of important decisions); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538 (2003) 
(finding a Texas statute that criminalized sodomy intruded into the personal and private 
lives of individuals and violated the right to liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
The Federal Trade Commission has committed to enforcing privacy promises even when 
the harm is not economic or physical or an unwanted intrusion, but merely unexpected 
disclosure of sensitive information about health or precise geolocation as well as less 
sensitive information such as purchase or employment history. FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS, 13–14 (March, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer
-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.  
 81. See Daniel J. Solove, “Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 
44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745 (2007). 
 82. Notice and choice were two of the first Fair Information Principles developed by 
a government advisory committee addressing privacy concerns in the United States. See 
Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History (Feb. 11, 2015), 
http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPPShistory.pdf (documenting the history of the 
Fair Information Principles as well as their influence on U.S. laws).  
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Other approaches suggest privacy standards should reflect cultural 
norms,83 and yet another view is that privacy might need to be imposed 
upon individuals by a paternalistic government.84  
Disputes over the role of confidentiality also contribute to the 
instability of any comprehensive taxonomy. While privacy is generally 
considered to be about an individual’s ability to avoid disclosure of his or 
her personal information, confidentiality is often used to describe a state of 
limited disclosure of that same information, perhaps to a person who has a 
duty to prevent further disclosure of conversations, such as an attorney 
providing legal advice. Some confidential relationships are recognized 
broadly throughout the law, while others are based on contractual 
principles or specific statutes that limit sharing of information.85 Still other 
confidential relationships are supported by cultural, religious, or other 
social norms and have no enforcement mechanisms in the law.  
 
 83. The two-prong Katz test for violations of the Fourth Amendment includes both 
a subjective test for the defendant’s expectation of privacy and an objective measure of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 347, 360–62 
(Harlan, J., concurring). The reasonable expectation prong might well be an assessment 
of existing societal norms and realities. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth 
Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2007) (noting that societal understandings 
of privacy could be relevant to determining what constitutes Fourth Amendment 
reasonable expectations). In the online context, industry self-regulation for privacy is 
largely a measure of how much intrusion the market will tolerate without calling on 
Congress to formally regulate. See Omer Tene & J. Trevor Hughes, The Promise and 
Shortcomings of Privacy Multistakeholder Policymaking: A Case Study, 66 ME. L. REV. 437 
(2014) (noting criticisms of industry codes of conduct and recommending structural 
supports to improve upon failed self-regulation). 
 84. See Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 755 (1999) 
(“Government will have to intervene in private lives for the sake of privacy and values 
associated with it.”). 
 85. Evidentiary privileges against compelled disclosures support several confidential 
relationships including attorney-client, spousal, clergy-penitent, and physician-patient 
relationships. Edward J. Imwinkelried, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON 
EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES §3.2.4 (2014); see also Neil M. Richards & 
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 
123 (2007) (promoting the common law claim of breach of duty of confidentiality). 
Consumer enforceability of privacy policies has not been successful because of an unclear 
contractual status and difficulty in proving harm. A variety of scholarly proposals have 
emerged. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763 
(2014); Joshua A. R. Fairfield, “Do-Not-Track” as Contract, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 545 (2012). Much of privacy protection is conducted by the Federal Trade 
Commission through its authority to investigate and bring actions to address “unfair or 
deceptive trade practices,” which have yielded some penalties for violations of privacy 
promises. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common 
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).  
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The role of practical obscurity adds another element to the conceptual 
framing of privacy. Like confidentiality, practical obscurity creates 
expectations of limited disclosure based on practical barriers to sharing 
rather than on legal or social restrictions. Most of the debate about 
confidentiality and practical obscurity relates to the role that the law 
should play in supporting these social or practical norms.86 
Context plays an important role in defining privacy, confidentiality, 
and practical obscurity, yet this is a difficult factor to encapsulate in a 
taxonomy of sensitive information. The contextual approach emphasizes 
that privacy risks vary based on the circumstances in which information is 
shared, including the relationships between the sharer and recipient as well 
as their expectations at the time of sharing. Time is also a contextual factor 
that can have an impact on both the harms and benefits that attach to the 
disclosure of sensitive information. Some approaches to privacy embrace 
the idea that the value of privacy increases over time compared with other 
interests,87 and yet in other instances privacy interests are treated as 
decreasing with the passage of time.88 
2. Charting the Piecemeal U.S. Approach to Privacy  
Another challenge in creating a taxonomy of sensitive information is 
that different information types are treated as sensitive in different areas of 
the law. The piecemeal approach evident in U.S. privacy law is a function 
of the federal system, a history of legislating in response to startling 
events,89 and the balancing of interests promoted by stakeholders. Many 
 
 86. See Nissenbaum, supra note 14, 155–56 (describing privacy norms as a function 
of many variables and suggesting that “protecting privacy will be a messy task”). 
 87. The Court of Justice of the European Union held that Google must remove 
from its search results a link to a news article about a foreclosure that occurred more than 
a decade ago because the information was no longer timely. Case C-131/12, Google 
Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (May 13, 2014), http://curia
.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&doclang=EN. 
 88. See Douglas A. Kysar, Kids & Cul-De-Sacs: Census 2000 and the Reproduction of 
Consumer Culture, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 853, 870–75 (2001) (discussing the privacy 
concerns with census data collection despite assurances of confidentiality); HIPAA 
Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(f) (2015) (requiring covered entities to comply with 
the requirements of the HIPAA Privacy Rule for a period of fifty years following a 
decedent’s death). 
 89. For example, Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), 18 
U.S.C. § 2710 (2012), in 1998 following the disclosure of Robert Bork’s video rental 
history during his nomination to the Supreme Court. See Neil M. Richards, The Perils of 
Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 694 (2013) (describing how “a horrified Congress 
quickly passed the VPPA,” perhaps upon realizing that politicians’ video rental records 
might otherwise be revealed as easily as Bork’s); Andrea Peterson, How a Failed Supreme 
Court Nomination Is Still Causing Headaches for Hulu and Netflix, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 
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U.S. privacy laws protect particular types of information within the 
context of a regulated sector, such as health care and banking, or within 
the context of limiting government power. The result is that particular 
information types may be protected in one sector although their privacy 
benefits can be outweighed by competing interests in another. Activity at 
the state level has also resulted in multiple approaches in areas such as data 
security breach notification requirements, and so the fragmentation is 
ongoing and pervades the U.S. legal system.  
A related issue for the creation of a comprehensive taxonomy is that 
some sensitive information types are more clearly defined by law than 
others. Some laws are grounded in general principles like “unfair or 
deceptive trade practices”90 or tautologies found in common law torts that 
provide civil remedies for the disclosure of “private facts.”91 These vague 
constitutional and tort protections for privacy contrast with health 
regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) that contains a list of seventeen sensitive information types 
that need to be redacted before regulated health entities can share personal 
health information.92 Some privacy-related laws do not define sensitive 
information types at all and instead draw on influential policy 
statements,93 industry standards,94 and other areas of law.95 Some U.S. 
 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/27/how-a-failed
-supreme-court-bid-is-still-causing-headaches-for-hulu-and-netflix. 
 90. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). Much of privacy 
law now comes from the FTC’s investigative and enforcement powers to bring or settle 
lawsuits when companies under their jurisdiction arguably fail to live up to their privacy 
promises. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 85. 
 91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (“One who gives publicity 
to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”). 
 92. HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2) (2015). The rule includes an 
eighteenth requirement, to remove “[a]ny other unique identifying number, characteristic 
or code.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(R) (2015).  
 93. See Gellman, supra note 82.  
 94. See PCI SSC Data Security Standards Overview, PCI SECURITY STANDARDS 
COUNSEL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/index.php (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2015). 
 95. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167–68 (2004) 
(finding that the Freedom of Information Act exemption for personal privacy extends to 
the familial concern in controlling the deceased’s death images, in accordance with 
common law notions of privacy). Some state court electronic filing rules refer to state 
identity theft and breach notice laws, such as in North Carolina. See N.C. eFiling Rules, 
supra note 10. Rule 6.3 for e-filing in North Carolina defines “private information,” as 
including sensitive, personal, or identifying information which must be excluded or 
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privacy laws are hybrids, with illustrative but non-exhaustive lists of 
protected information types.96 Sometimes information is protected from 
some uses but not others, as in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which 
limits the circumstances under which a consumer reporting agency can 
distribute consumer credit reports.97  
Whatever benefits the sectoral approach brings, they are increasingly 
threatened by the ease with which information can be shared and 
aggregated. The increase in data brokers and the work of computer 
scientists and journalists highlight the leaky boundaries between separately 
regulated sectors and the potential for recreating previously redacted 
information by merging separate databases.98 Information not restricted 
from disclosure in one context can obviate privacy protections in other 
parts of the dynamic information ecosystem. This development affects not 
just those individuals whose sensitive information is exposed through one 
sector but also those industry actors who invest in costly privacy and 
security approaches that prove to be ineffective. Public records in 
particular can spoil the privacy protections required in other areas because 
 
partially described in court documents. The statutory basis for Rule 6.3 is N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 132-1.10(d). 
 96. See Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2012); 
Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, 777 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that the DPPA’s 
prohibition on disclosure of personal information in driving records did not raise 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny). The Freedom of Information Act lists 
exemptions, but refers to “personal privacy” somewhat unhelpfully. 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(2012). 
 97. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2012). 
 98. Journalists have been able to identify “anonymous” Internet users through 
records of their search history. Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for 
AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9E0CE3DD1F3FF93AA3575BC0A9609C8B63. Researchers have 
used “anonymous” Netflix viewing information released by the company to re-identify 
some of its customers. Steve Lohr, Netflix Cancels Contest Plans and Settles Suit, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 12, 2010), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/netflix-cancels
-contest-plans-and-settles-suit. A graduate computer science student at MIT was able to 
re-identify the Governor of Massachusetts William Weld through presumptively 
anonymized state hospital records; the student recently reported forty percent re-
identification capabilities in most contexts. Latanya Sweeney et al., Identifying 
Participants in the Personal Genome Project by Name (Apr. 29, 2013), http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2257732. The FTC’s 2014 report on Data Brokers 
outlined a growing industry of data collectors and resellers who intermingle public 
records, information on the web, and proprietary data. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA 
BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2014), https://www
.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report
-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.  
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they provide information that can be used for re-identifying individuals or 
for connecting a profile with information that carries privacy risks.  
With these concerns in mind, we set out to create a sensitive 
information taxonomy that would allow for the identification of sensitive 
information in court records. We utilized a taxonomic approach for several 
reasons. First, we wanted to study the frequency of sensitive information 
in court records without first making a normative claim about what 
information types should be considered private. As a result, we cast the net 
widely and included a large number of information types, even those that 
appeared to have only a modicum of support in existing privacy law and 
scholarship. Second, we believe that the process we undertook to create 
our taxonomy will be valuable to other scholars and policymakers. In the 
sections that follow, we describe how we created our taxonomy and why 
we chose the information types that we did. Of course, not everyone will 
agree with our final list. Nevertheless, our taxonomy has proven to be a 
helpful guide in the assessment of the privacy risks that can arise from the 
public disclosure of court records, especially at a time when privacy laws 
have limited or unclear application to such records. Finally, even for those 
who disagree with our inclusions and exclusions, the instant taxonomy will 
serve as a useful starting point for the development of alternative 
taxonomies that scholars can apply to other information contexts. 
B. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THIS STUDY 
This project’s taxonomy of sensitive information represents a broad list 
of information types that are protected by U.S. privacy law or that have 
been identified by scholars or others as information that should be 
protected from public disclosure.99 To facilitate coding and analysis of the 
court records in our study, we grouped the various sensitive information 
types into the following thirteen categories: 
1. Assets 
2. Civil Proceedings 
3. Computer Use 
4. Criminal Proceedings 
5. Education 
6. Employment 
7. Financial Information 
8. Health 
 
 99. We conducted a survey of federal and state constitutional, tort, statutory, and 
regulatory law as well as federal and state court rules, European law, and legal 
scholarship. 
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9. Identity 
10. Images 
11. Intellectual Pursuits 
12. Location 
13. Sexual Activities 
These are thematic categories that capture similarities in subject 
matter for the 140 sensitive information types that we searched for in the 
court records. Some information types logically fit in multiple categories, 
but we placed them in one category as a matter of simplicity for the coding 
and analysis of the records. There are, of course, other ways the individual 
information types can be categorized. We describe the makeup of each 
category in the sections that follow and provide a full listing of all of the 
coded information types in the Appendix.  
After initial testing of the taxonomy, we decided to limit recording of 
sensitive information types to those occurrences that the coder could 
associate with an identified individual. In other words, we only coded for 
sensitive information that was associated with a person named in full or by 
last name within the brief or appendices of each document in the study. 
The identified individual did not have to be named on the same page 
where the sensitive information type occurred, but the association had to 
be clear to the coder from the information within the document.100 For 
example, we would code for “Anne Klinefelter’s Browning semi-automatic 
handgun” because it is apparent from the document that the gun is owned 
or possessed by Anne, but we would not code for “a Browning semi-
automatic handgun was found in the street outside the grocery store” 
because the information is not associated with an identified individual.101  
 
 100. The only exception we made was for social security numbers because of their 
utility as a stand-in for personal identification. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 101. Our requirement that sensitive information types needed to be associated with 
individuals named within the court briefs means that our findings do not include data 
that might directly support considerations of how discrete appearances of sensitive 
information (not associated with persons identified in court records) might be linked to 
individuals when court records are read in conjunction with outside sources. See FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 80, at 35–38 
(suggesting that non-personally identifying information (PII) can be increasingly 
transformed into personally identifying information through re-identification); 
Christopher Wolf, Technological Advances and Privacy Challenges, in UNDERSTANDING 
DEVELOPMENTS IN CYBERSPACE LAW 23 (2014) (advising that traditional solutions 
focused on personally identifying information are undercut by big data practices and 
should be supplemented with techniques such as measuring risk of re-identification, and 
noting that publicly released data present greater risks for re-identification than data not 
publicly released); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a 
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We did not record occurrences of names alone, other than the names 
of minor children, absent some connection between the name and another 
piece of sensitive information (e.g., a person named as a juror, witness, or 
rape victim).102 Where an individual was associated with another piece of 
sensitive information, we coded for whether the individual was an “adult,” 
“minor,” or “unknown.” In privacy law, minors receive more protection 
than adults, so this status is itself a piece of sensitive information.103 We 
did not code for information types associated with entities such as 
businesses, associations, and other groups.  
What follows is an overview of the information types and categories in 
our taxonomy and some description of the sources that we used to create 
the taxonomy.  
1. Assets 
The “assets” category contains information relating to an identified 
person’s possession or ownership of assets that might be considered 
sensitive, including financial assets, real estate, and vehicle identification 
numbers and license plate numbers. It also contains information indicating 
that an individual has a gun permit, filed a gun permit application, or 
possessed or owned a gun.  
Scholars have noted that property ownership, including real estate 
ownership or rental status, constitutes information that can be used to 
identify individuals and that enables the creation of profiles used by data 
aggregators.104 The Federal Trade Commission has noted that property 
records maintained by states are part of a growing data broker industry 
 
New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1836–47 
(2011) (noting that non-PII are no longer immutable categories due to the risk of re-
identification and proposing an assessment using a continuum of identification risk). 
 102. We tested the coding of every appearance of a name early in the project, but so 
many names appeared in the briefs and appendices that it threatened to overwhelm our 
resources. We decided to leave this particular type of examination of court records to 
other researchers. 
 103. See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 6501–06 (2012); REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, PRIVATE EYES: 
CONFIDENTIALITY ISSUES AND ACCESS TO POLICE INVESTIGATION RECORDS 4–5 
(2010), http://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/PRIVATEEYES.pdf (discussing protections 
for juvenile records); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22581 (2015) (protecting minors 
online). Court electronic filing rules also generally allow for the replacement of the names 
of minors with their initials. See supra note 10. 
 104. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in 
Public, 17 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 559, 561, 577 (1998) (listing information types 
traditionally treated as public and increasingly being used in the digital environment as 
identifying information in the organized surveillance of individuals).  
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that creates some risks of harm for consumers.105 Vehicle identification 
numbers and license plate numbers are used in similar ways and are 
restricted under some state laws as well as the federal Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act.106  
Information on gun ownership and possession is included because 
some states have passed legislation to protect the privacy of gun owners. 
For example, North Carolina exempts gun registration records from its 
public records law which would otherwise require public access to that 
information.107 The Florida Firearm Owners Privacy Act limits a 
physician’s ability to inquire about firearm access in patient interviews.108 
In addition, scholars raise the possibility that public disclosure of gun 
registration unconstitutionally burdens the right to bear arms.109 
2. Civil Proceedings 
The “civil proceedings” category is an organizing point for a number of 
types of information that relate to civil lawsuits and other non-criminal 
judicial proceedings. This category includes information relating to 
adoption, child support, civil commitment to a penal or mental facility, 
custody or guardianship proceedings, information indicating that an 
 
 105. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS supra note 98, at 11–12 (reporting how 
state and local government records including property records are collected by data 
brokers either directly or indirectly); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING 
CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 80, at 69 (recommending legislation to improve 
transparency in the data broker industry). 
 106. For example, North Carolina limits the sharing of vehicle identification 
numbers acquired through toll road administration. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-89.213 
(2015). Regulations implementing the HIPAA Privacy Rule prohibit the sharing of 
vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers, connected to 
personal health information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(L) (2015). The federal 
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2012), limits state 
departments of motor vehicles from sharing personal information except for specified 
purposes. The statute has been read to curtail distribution of “personal information,” 
which is defined broadly. See Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, 777 F.3d 937, 943 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (“[T]he DPPA’s language appears broad: personal information means 
information that identifies an individual, . . . and there is no indication that Congress 
intended the enumerated list of examples to be exhaustive.” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 107. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-415.17(c), 14-405(b), 14-406(a) (2015).  
 108. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(finding constitutional the effect of the Florida Firearm Owners Privacy Act on 
physicians’ free speech rights); Act of April 26, 2011, 2011 Fla. Laws 112 (codified at 
FLA. STAT. §§ 381.026, 456.072, 790.338). 
 109. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1548–
49 (2009). 
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identified individual was the subject of a dependency or neglect 
proceeding, party to a divorce, juror name, and prior adverse civil 
judgments.  
Information that falls within this category may be regarded as sensitive 
because individuals have no choice but to share these types of personal 
information in order to make use of government services or to remain law-
abiding citizens.110 The particular privacy implications of each of these 
information types are also advanced because of the special dignitary harms 
or, in the case of juror names, risk of retaliatory harms from public 
disclosure.111 Information arising in civil proceedings that falls into a more 
specific category such as financial or health information is included in 
those more detailed categories below.  
3. Computer Use 
A number of information types that relate to an individual’s use of 
computers or electronic information services comprise the “computer use” 
category: Instant Messenger or SMS identifier; IP address; Internet search 
history; Internet Service Provider (ISP) records including account number, 
billing information, or online access logs; computer password; Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID); screen or user name for accessing a 
website or other online service; and Voice Over Internet (VOIP) username 
or number. These information types are culled from several different 
federal and state statutes as well as scholarship advocating protection for 
this kind of information.112 
 
 110. See Grayson Barber, Personal Information in Government Records: Protecting the 
Public Interest in Privacy, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV 63, 71–72 (2006) (suggesting that 
court records “often contain information that is exquisitely personal”); Whalen v. Roe, 
429 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1977) (holding that a state database on individuals with 
prescriptions for controlled substances did not violate a right to privacy because the data 
was not for public disclosure and was kept secure); Grayson Barber & Frank L. Corrado, 
Public Access to Government Records and How Transparency Protects Privacy, N.J. LAW., 
Oct. 2011, at 60 (protesting the government practice of selling personal information, and 
advocating transparency in order to generate citizen advocacy for greater privacy 
protection).  
 111. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Disclosure of Juror Identities to the Press: Who Will Speak for 
the Jurors?, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1 (2009) (advocating confidentiality 
of jury service to protect former jurors from harassment and physical threats); Kristin A. 
Henderson, Lessons from Bankruptcy Court Public Records, 23 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. 
Q. 55, 73, 76–77 (2004) (evaluating the particular sensitivity of information provided in 
bankruptcy proceedings). 
 112. See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), C.F.R. §§ 312.1–
2; Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency 
and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
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4. Criminal Proceedings 
Like the civil proceedings category, the “criminal proceedings” 
category serves as an organizing device for sensitive information related to 
the justice system. For this category, the information types are associated 
with law enforcement and criminal judicial proceedings, including 
information that identifies an individual as the subject of a criminal 
investigation, arrest, incarceration, conviction, sentence, or parole. The 
category also includes mug shots and pre-sentence investigation reports, 
sexual abuse allegations, child abuse allegations, and information 
concerning charges or convictions arising in juvenile proceedings. 
Additional information types are included for juror name, domestic 
violence victim name, rape victim name, and other crime victim name. 
The criminal proceedings category also includes cooperating defendant 
name, informant name, and witness name.  
The information types we have listed within this category are widely 
regarded as sensitive.113 For example, many scholars assert that the public 
disclosure of the names of crime victims and witnesses leads to the further 
victimization of those who have suffered from or witnessed criminal 
activity.114 Others point to the stigma that attaches to individuals who 
have been subjected to criminal investigation, charge, or conviction.115  
 
281, (2012); Chris J. Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot 
Refuse, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 273 (2012). 
 113. See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 54–69 (2015) 
(describing the many types of criminal information in court records and criticizing their 
widespread availability); Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect: In Search 
of a Right, In Need of a Rule, 64 MD. L. REV. 755 (2005) (proposing increased privacy 
protections for the criminally-accused); Deanna K. Shullman & Mark R. Caramanica, 
Mug Shots on Lockdown: Government and Citizen Backlash to “Exploitation” Websites Surges, 
Free Speech is the Casualty, 30 COMM. LAW. 13 (2014) (surveying responses to businesses 
offering to take down mug shots for a fee and examining a split in federal circuit courts 
on the constitutionality of restrictions); Rebecca Hulse, Privacy and Domestic Violence in 
Court, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 237 (2010) (examining the privacy rights of 
domestic violence victims in court and concluding that special protections should extend 
beyond family court contexts); Morrison, supra note 16 at 921 (highlighting the risks of 
harm from online court records in criminal cases and recommending the redaction of 
names of cooperating defendants and other informants while increasing transparency in 
the use of these law enforcement practices). 
 114. See, e.g., Joel M. Schumm, No Names, Please: The Virtual Victimization of 
Children, Crime Victims, the Mentally Ill, and Others in Appellate Court Opinions, 42 GA. L. 
REV. 471, 486–93 (2008). 
 115. See, e.g., Devah Pager, Bruce Western & Naomi Sugie, Sequencing Disadvantage: 
Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and White Men with Criminal Records, 623 
ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195, 199 (2009), http://ann.sagepub.com/
content/623/1/195 (finding that men with a felony drug conviction were fifty percent less 
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The combination of online and data broker exposure of often stale and 
incomplete arrest and conviction information is criticized as creating long-
term barriers to fresh starts including negative impacts on “employment 
and housing prospects, parental rights, educational opportunities, freedom 
of movement, and just about every other aspect of daily life.”116 Broad 
exposure of and reliance on records of criminal activity is said to 
permanently mark ex-offenders as outlaws and restrict their ability to forge 
a path outside of crime, “a terrible outcome for society.”117 Information 
arising in juvenile delinquency proceedings has long been considered to be 
particularly sensitive because the disclosure of such information was 
“thought to hinder their rehabilitation by impairing their relations with 
the community [and] by stigmatizing them such that they view themselves 
as wrongdoers and act accordingly.”118  
As a result, a number of states have adopted or are considering broad 
sealing and expungement laws for various types of criminal information.119 
Although some of these laws will likely face significant constitutional 
challenges,120 there is clearly a concerted effort by privacy and criminal 
justice advocates to limit the public disclosure of many types of criminal 
information. 
5. Education  
The “education” category encompasses five information types that 
relate to students at all levels of the education system: income eligibility 
for the National School Lunch program, the amount of financial aid 
awarded from federal or private sources, information indicating that a 
student was disciplined by his or her school, grades or other feedback from 
a school about a student’s performance, and student identifiers.  
Educational information is generally regarded as sensitive because it 
relates to a vulnerable class of individuals, often minors, who must share 
information with educational institutions, sometimes in a compulsory 
 
likely than men without any record to receive a callback or be offered an entry-level job; 
black men with a record who applied were twice as likely as white men to be saddled with 
this “criminal record penalty”). 
 116. See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2 
WIS. L. REV. 321, 327 (2015). 
 117. JACOBS, supra note 113, at 306. 
 118. Reza, supra note 113, at 785. 
 119. See Roberts, supra note 116, at 322. 
 120. See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text. 
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education context. The information types included in this category are 
drawn from several federal statutory protections.121 
6. Employment 
Three information types are included in the “employment” category: 
information that an individual was disciplined by an employer, 
information describing an individual’s military discharge, and performance 
evaluations of an employee. Information about the location where an 
individual works is included in the “location” category. 
Employee privacy requirements vary by jurisdiction under statutory 
and common law.122 In some states, performance evaluations are exempt 
from public disclosure.123 The federal Freedom of Information Act 
includes an exemption for disclosure of contents of personnel files if that 
information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy,124 and this exemption has been applied to performance 
appraisals.125 Private employee privacy in performance appraisals varies, 
but in some states this information is protected by statute or by common 
law.126 
 
 121. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act protects student education 
records of institutions receiving federal funding. Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 99 (2015). The National School Lunch 
Act protects the confidentiality of the names of individual students who qualify for school 
lunch assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 1758(6) (2012).  
 122. See Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment 
Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1996); Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords
-2013.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (listing recent legislation intended to strengthen 
workplace privacy regarding personal employee social media and other accounts); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1.2, 160A-168 (2015). 
 123. States take different approaches to the accessibility of public employees’ 
performance evaluations. See Roger A. Nowadsky, A Comparative Analysis of Public 
Records Statutes, 28 URB. LAW. 65, 86 (1996) (surveying states’ laws and finding that in 
most states personnel files are presumptively private).  
 124. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2012). 
 125. McLeod v. U.S. Coast Guard, No. 96-5071, 1997 WL 150096 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(finding privacy interest in Coast Guard officer’s evaluation report); Smith v. Dep’t of 
Labor, 798 F. Supp. 2d 274, 284–85 (2011) (holding that disclosure of records 
containing performance appraisal information would constitute an unwarranted invasion 
of employee’s personal privacy.)  
 126. See Laura B. Pincus and Clayton Trotter, The Disparity Between Public and 
Private Sector Employee Privacy Protections: A Call For Legitimate Privacy Rights for Private 
Sector Workers, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 51, 54 (1995) (comparing states’ approaches under 
statute and common law). 
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7.  Financial Information 
The “financial information” category contains a number of information 
types that relate to a person’s financial condition and accounts. Separate 
types were specified for the account numbers associated with an 
individual’s savings, checking, or other financial account; loan account 
numbers; credit card numbers; debit card numbers; and other types of 
financial accounts not already specified. Other information types in this 
category include information indicating that a person filed for bankruptcy 
or was adjudged to be bankrupt, that a person has been the subject of a 
foreclosure judgment, that a person owes a debt, or that a person has a lien 
on assets due to unpaid taxes. The ownership of physical financial assets 
such as stock certificates, cash, and coins is included in the “assets” 
category. 
Tax returns are listed in this category as is information about 
compensation in the form of salary, wage, or other financial benefits, 
including stock options, court ordered payments, and other forms of 
compensation.127 Insurance policy numbers, credit reports, and an 
individual’s status as an identity theft victim are also considered sensitive 
information types under various laws. 
Information that falls within this category is regarded as sensitive 
because it not only reveals details about a person’s net worth, but it also 
may be useful in the commission of identity theft and consequential 
financial theft or credit harm. States have passed varying forms of 
restrictions on the sharing of financial and identifying information in 
order to reduce the risk of identity theft.128 Other statutes such as the 
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
provide protections for consumers seeking to restrict sharing of financial 
and related information.129 In addition, debt and bankruptcy can result in 
 
 127. See Cynthia Blum, The Flat Tax: A Panacea for Privacy Concerns?, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1241, 1262–81 (2005) (outlining a variety of harms that could result from 
inappropriate uses of tax information and recommending safeguards against disclosure 
and misuse). 
 128. The National Conference of State Legislatures maintains a chart of state data 
security breach notification laws intended to provide individuals an opportunity to 
monitor credit and financial accounts and to change passwords and credit card numbers 
to minimize the potential for identity-theft and related harms. Security Breach Notification 
Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx 
(last updated Jan. 4, 2016). 
 129. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012)); Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
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negative treatment even after an individual has regained financial 
stability.130 The evolving law of court rules for electronic filing generally 
requires redaction of financial account numbers.131 
8. Health 
The “health” category includes information about abortion, cause of 
death, place of death, communicable diseases, dates of a hospital stay, 
disability status, drug or alcohol dependency, drug or alcohol treatment, 
HIV/AIDS status, and information relating to prescription medications. 
Paternity test information and pregnancy information are both in this 
category. Also included in this category are health plan beneficiary 
numbers, medical billing numbers, medical device identifiers or serial 
numbers, and medical record numbers. Other information in this category 
includes health diagnosis or treatment information not previously 
specified, genetic information, and medical conditions that are not the 
subject of diagnosis or treatment by a health care professional. 
Information that falls within this category is regarded as highly 
sensitive because of the potential for discrimination based on perceptions 
of reduced capabilities or assumptions about unpopular causal behaviors.132 
Confidentiality of health information shared with a physician dates at least 
as far back as the Hippocratic Oath,133 and is protected by many privilege 
laws and tort liability in some situations.134  
The sources for information under the health category include the 
regulations authorized by HIPAA and its amendments,135 privacy tort 
 
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 527(4), 113 Stat. 1338, 1449 (1999) (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 6827(4) (2012)). 
 130. Negative treatment of an individual based on debt that has been settled is 
sometimes considered an inappropriate response that should be prevented through 
restrictions in access to information about the debt. The right to be forgotten decision in 
Spain addressed this issue. See supra note 87. 
 131. See supra note 10. 
 132. See Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad for Your Health? 17 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 481, 491–95 (2000) (reporting overwhelming public support for health privacy and 
articulating the harms of privacy violations as well as some benefits for certain 
exceptions). 
 133. Oath and Law of Hippocrates, circa 400 B.C. 
 134. Most states recognize an evidentiary privilege for physician-patient 
communications. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY 
PRIVILEGES § 6.2.6 (2014); McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 437 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 1997) (reviewing the law of other states and joining the majority to recognize a tort 
for a “physician’s breach of the duty to maintain the confidences of his or her patient in 
the absence of a compelling public interest or other justification for the disclosure”). 
 135. The HIPAA Privacy Rule prevents the sharing of personal health information 
unless it is de-identified through the redaction of seventeen identifiers or through some 
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cases,136 and federal constitutional law suggesting that information privacy 
may apply to some prescriptions.137 The federal Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act provides regulatory protection for genetic 
information.138  
9. Identity 
The “identity” category contains a number of information types that 
relate to an individual’s physical and other characteristics that allow others 
to identify the individual. Like the other information types that we coded, 
information in this category must be associated with an identified 
individual. We did not code for the occurrence of full names or last names 
alone, even though we did use the appearance of associated names as the 
qualifying factor for almost all of the information types. We coded for 
Social Security Number (SSN) with or without names because SSNs are 
unique identifiers on their own.139 We found that tracking names was 
simply too coder-intensive and provided inconsistent levels of information 
given that some names are common in the population and others are not. 
We did, however, code for the name of a minor child if it appeared in the 
 
approved statistical approach. HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2) (2015). 
The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act prohibits states from selling or otherwise sharing 
drivers’ “highly restricted personal information.” 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2012). 
 136. See, e.g., Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics and Gynecology, 314 Conn. 433 
(2014); Robert H. Thornburg, Florida Privacy Law: Potential Application of Intentional 
Tort Principles and Florida’s Constitutional Right of Privacy as Safeguards to Governmental 
and Private Dissemination of Private Information, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 137 (2003). 
 137. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (holding that a New York 
database containing the names of individuals who were prescribed a controlled drug to 
treat depression did not burden a constitutional right to privacy because the statute had a 
rational basis and because the state adopted reasonable data security, but suggesting that a 
right to avoid wide disclosure of prescription information was at issue). 
 138. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-233, 122 Stat. 881; 20 C.F.R. § 1635.1–12 (2015). 
 139. For a discussion of why we did not code for names alone, see supra note 102 
and accompanying text. The perceived utility of social security numbers in facilitating 
identity theft and financial harm has inspired many states to pass legislation to restrict 
government collection of this information. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.10(d) 
(“No person preparing or filing a document to be recorded or filed in the official records 
of the register of deeds, the Department of the Secretary of State, or of the courts may 
include any person’s social security, employer taxpayer identification, drivers license, state 
identification, passport, checking account, savings account, credit card, or debit card 
number, or personal identification (PIN) code or passwords in that document, unless 
otherwise expressly required by law or court order, adopted by the State Registrar on 
records of vital events, or redacted.”). 
  
1846 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:3  
records because privacy laws provide special protection for children in a 
variety of contexts.140  
The identity category includes driver’s license number, email address, 
fax number, mother’s maiden name, passport number, city and state of 
birth, professional certificate or license number, state identification 
number, and telephone number. Although we initially sought to code for 
gender,141 we ultimately dropped this information type because it became 
unworkable. English language and naming conventions make gender cues 
so numerous that it was overwhelming the coding process.142 We kept an 
information type for gender identity change, even though that designation 
is itself a contested and complicated issue.  
This category also includes a number of information types associated 
with biological traits. Age, date of birth, date of death, barefoot print, 
fingerprint, gait, iris print or recognition, and voice print are included 
here, as are racial or ethnic origin. Some of this biological information is 
considered sensitive under a number of laws and is the subject of 
scholarship advocating increased privacy protection relating to the 
collection and use of biometric information.143 Dates of birth and death 
 
 140. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act provides special requirements for 
the collection of identifying information from children under the age of thirteen 
including first and last name. 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–3 (implementing 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
6508). Federal Model Rule of Appellate Procedure 5.2(a)(3) provides that minor children 
may be identified with initials only. The North Carolina e-filing rules permits minors to 
be “identified by initials,” N.C. eFiling Rules, supra note 10, at Rule 6.3; see also Schumm, 
supra note 114.  
 141. Federal and state statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender in 
contexts such as employment and housing. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, color, 
national origin, sex, and religion); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604 (prohibiting housing rental or sale on the basis of certain traits including sex). 
Constitutional protections have also been recognized for gender nondiscrimination. See 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender 
discrimination). While access to gender information is generally not restricted, requests 
for information relating to gender can create vulnerability for discrimination claims, so 
this information has been considered sensitive.  
 142. Pronouns alone triggered huge numbers of coding opportunities and created 
confusion about their meaning as neutral or gender-aware applications. In addition, 
coders might misread some names as conveying gender information. 
 143. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), an agency of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, states, “Biometric technologies are used to establish or 
verify personal identity against previously enrolled individuals based upon recognition of a 
physiological or behavioral characteristic. Examples of biological characteristics include 
hand, finger, facial, and iris. Behavioral characteristics are traits that are learned or 
acquired, such as dynamic signature verification and keystroke dynamics.” Biometric 
Standards Program and Resource Center, NIST, http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/scm/
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are restricted from disclosure under regulations implementing HIPAA. 
State identity-theft protection acts and court rules for electronic filing 
systems tend to require redaction of full birth dates.144 Racial and ethnic 
origin define groups that are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment 
and by nondiscrimination statutes that generally place limitations on 
access to or use of this information.145 
10. Images 
The “images” category captures occurrence of photographs and video 
that contain a full-frontal view of an individual’s face or features; show 
sexual organs of an undressed individual; show a person in a state of partial 
undress indicated to be taken without their consent; and photographs or 
videos depicting violence, abuse, or death of an individual. Video 
recordings that depict sexual acts are included in the “sexual activities” 
category. 
These information types are drawn from protections provided through 
privacy torts, state statutes, and scholarship advocating additional 
protections for images, especially with the growing use of facial 
recognition.146 
 
biometric-standards.cfm (last updated March 19, 2015); see also Margaret Hu, Biometric 
ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475 (2013); Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, 
Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 407 (2012). Regulations implementing HIPAA restrict distribution of 
personal health information that contains biometric identifiers including finger and voice 
prints. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(P) (2015); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
113.20(b)(11) (2015). 
 144. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(C); North Carolina Identity Theft Act, N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14-113.20. 
 145. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200, 201–02 (1995); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249–50 (2003); see also Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (prohibiting employment 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and religion); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012) (prohibiting age 
discrimination against individuals over forty). States may also have nondiscrimination 
laws. While these statutes may not prohibit the gathering of information related to the 
protected traits, a strong defense against discrimination claims is that the sensitive 
information was not accessed.  
 146. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.8. (protecting the confidentiality of 
photographs and video or audio recordings made pursuant to autopsy). Nonconsensual 
sharing of nude photographs or images of sexual activity are the subject of privacy torts 
claims and new statutes. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing 
Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014); Clay Calvert & Justin Brown, 
Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the Internet: Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace, 18 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 469 (2000); Jeffrey R. Boles, Documenting Death: Public 
Access to Government Death Records and Attendant Privacy Concerns, 22 CORNELL J.L. & 
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11. Intellectual Pursuits 
The “intellectual pursuits” category is a catch-all category that covers a 
range of information considered to be sensitive because it conveys 
information about the thoughts and views of individuals.147 It includes 
cable television subscription records, cable television viewing history, video 
rental records, records of library use, and records of reading material 
purchased. Also in this category are the content of recorded conversations, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union 
membership, and voting information.148 While activity on the Internet 
often reveals similar information,149 we did not include computer-related 
identifiers in this category. Those identifiers were included under the 
computer use category. 
A variety of statutes at the federal and state level address television 
viewing, video rental, and library use.150 Records of books purchased may 
be protected as a constitutional right or through state legislation.151 The 
 
PUB. POL’Y 237 (2012) (examining the inconsistent treatment of death records including 
images in terms of access and privacy); Hu, supra note 143, at 1484–91 (explaining how 
face-recognition technologies and practices are growing while individuals are largely 
unaware of the privacy threats). 
 147. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 408 (2008) 
(“[W]e should understand intellectual privacy as a series of nested protections, with the 
most private area of our thoughts at the center, and gradually expanding outward to 
encompass our reading, our communications, and our expressive dealings with others.”). 
 148. Federal and state wiretap laws offer protection against undisclosed recording of 
conversations in some contexts. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522. Anonymity of speech 
is given some First Amendment protection, particularly in cases involving speech related 
to political activity and voting, religious freedom, trade union membership, and other 
associational activities. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 
(1958) (holding that compelled disclosure of names of members would burden the right 
to freedom of association). 
 149. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright 
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 981–82 (1996); Richards, supra note 
147, at 388–89. 
 150. The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006), restricts video 
rental companies from sharing individuals’ viewing habits. The Cable Communications 
Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)–(h) (2006), restricts disclosure of personally identifiable 
cable viewing records by cable television companies. Forty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia have statutes protecting some level of confidentiality of library use, and the 
remaining states, Hawaii and Kentucky, have Attorney General Opinions stating that the 
law of the state extends similar protection. The American Library Association maintains 
links to these state library confidentiality laws. State Privacy Laws Regarding Library 
Records, AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/advocacy/privacyconfidentiality/
privacy/stateprivacy (last visited Feb. 2, 2016). 
 151. Bookstores have asserted the confidentiality of books purchased. See Tattered 
Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1053 (Colo. 2002) (finding that the 
Colorado constitution provided a higher level of protection than the federal constitution 
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confidentiality of associations that reveal unpopular political beliefs has 
been recognized as protected under the U.S. Constitution,152 and scholars 
have advocated for recognition of other intellectual privacy protections.153 
12. Location 
Information in the “location” category includes geolocation 
information, home address, school address, and work address. Another 
information type in this category is full zip code with four or more digits 
that are associated with an identified individual.  
At present, geolocation information is considered sensitive 
information requiring limits on disclosure under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act’s Section 5 “unfair or deceptive trade practices” 
protections.154 Geolocation information is considered sensitive when it is 
collected from a child using the Internet, and collection of this 
information is restricted under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act.155 Travel patterns evident in geolocation information are arguably 
sufficiently sensitive to merit Fourth Amendment recognition.156  
 
when First Amendment and Fourth Amendment interests intersect in the case of law 
enforcement seeking book purchase records). California extends protection for e-reader 
privacy in the Reader Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.90 (2011). 
 152. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 463.  
 153. See Anita L. Allen, Associational Privacy and the First Amendment: NAACP v. 
Alabama, Privacy, and Data Protection, 1 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1 (2011) (reviewing 
the growth of protections for associational privacy, decisional privacy, and anonymity 
after NAACP v. Alabama); Neil Richards, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY 5, 161 (2015) 
(examining law, policy, and practical approaches to “safeguard the processes of 
intellectual explorations and belief formation” and advocating for recognition that 
“intellectual records are sensitive records that demand higher protection than other kinds of 
data”). Additionally, the European Union provides protection for “personal data 
revealing . . . political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, [or] trade-union 
membership . . . .” Council Directive 95/46, art. 8, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 38 (EC). 
 154. Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on S. 271, The Location 
Privacy Protection Act of 2014 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. for Privacy, 
Tech. and the Law, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Jessica L. Rich, Dir. Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, Fed. Trade Comm’n), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/313671/140604locationprivacyact.pdf; FTC Casebook: 
Goldenshores Technologies, LLC & Eric M Geidl, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROF’LS, 
https://privacyassociation.org/resources/ftc-casebook/goldenshores-technologies-llc-erik
-m-geidl (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (providing case documents and analysis of FTC 
action regarding the deceptive use of geolocation data); FTC Casebook: Aspen Way 
Enterprises, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROF’LS, https://privacyassociation.org/resources/ftc
-casebook/aspen-way-enterprises (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (discussing geolocation data). 
 155. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
6506 (2012); 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–13 (2015). 
 156. See Hu, supra note 143, at 1481–82, 1500–03 (questioning the capacity of 
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to prevent growth in body and device tracking 
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13. Sexual Activities 
The “sexual activities” category contains two information types: 
information about sexual activity and video or audio recordings of an 
identified individual engaged in a sexual act. Information and images 
relating to sexual activity are sometimes protected through privacy torts 
and through state statutes designed to address hidden cameras and non-
consensual distribution.157  
IV. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
To better understand the privacy interests that might be implicated by 
public access to court records, we selected a random sample of court 
records from a large corpus of North Carolina Supreme Court case files 
that are part of an ongoing digitization project by the UNC Law Library. 
We coded these documents in order to collect data about the frequency of 
appearance of sensitive information in the records, as well as other 
contextual information about the documents and the underlying cases. 
Once the coding was complete, we used statistical software to analyze the 
data we collected.  
A. CORPUS OF COURT RECORDS UNDER STUDY 
The UNC Law library has approximately 400 bound volumes of North 
Carolina Supreme Court case filings from 1928 to 2000. In 2013, the 
library embarked on an ambitious project to digitize some of these records 
and eventually make a version of them available and searchable online.158 
To date, the library has digitized 12,137 briefs and other filings from the 
North Carolina Supreme Court comprising 535,106 pages.159 Each case 
 
practices and detailing how geolocation tracking is expanding); Joel R. Reidenberg, 
Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 155–57 (2014) (proposing a new Fourth 
Amendment doctrine to address geolocational and other types of privacy).  
 157. Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy 
Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887 (2006); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 272, § 105 (2015) (criminalizing the taking of “up-skirt” photos); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:14-9 (West 2015) (criminalizing “revenge porn”). 
 158. The North Carolina Supreme Court began providing electronic access to its 
filings in 2000, but does not provide electronic access to records from prior years. Copies 
of filings prior to 2000 were shared with several non-court libraries in the state, including 
the UNC Law Library.  
 159. For the period 1984–2000, the library has scanned and digitized the case fillings 
from 2255 cases heard by the North Carolina Supreme Court; this is approximately 85% 
of the cases in which the court issued a decision during this time period. For reasons 
unknown, the court did not send the library any case filings from approximately 15% of 
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file in this corpus contains at least one merits brief,160 which may include 
an appendix. When a brief does have an appendix, it may contain court 
transcripts, witness testimony, and exhibits entered into evidence such as 
bank statements, medical records, psychological evaluations, and emails. 
Our study used a stratified random sample by year of documents 
pulled from this corpus of records spanning the time period 1984 to 2000. 
These documents included briefs and petitions for discretionary review, 
along with their associated appendices. We did not review the “record on 
appeal,” which is a separate filing containing, inter alia, copies of the case 
pleadings, jury instructions, transcripts, and other evidence filed in the 
lower courts.161 In total, we analyzed 504 documents drawn from 466 
cases.162 One hundred and ninety-eight (39%) of these documents 
contained an appendix. 
B. CODING AND ANALYSIS 
We then performed content analysis on the documents in our 
sample.163 This involved coding each document based on its content and 
case characteristics. The coding, which was performed by a team of eleven 
research assistants, captured information about each document (e.g., 
document type, length); information about the underlying case (e.g., date, 
case type); the type of sensitive information found in the record (e.g., 
social security number, HIV status); the general category of sensitive 
information (e.g., financial, health); and information about the location of 
 
the cases the court heard and decided during this time period. These digitized records are 
being redacted in preparation for posting as searchable documents on the Internet. 
 160. In addition to a brief filed by the appellant, the case files also contain briefs by 
the appellee, reply briefs, and amicus curiae briefs. For cases that do not involve an appeal 
as of right to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the case file will also contain a petition 
for discretionary review. 
 161. See N.C. R. APP. P. 9. The UNC Law Library is not digitizing these records. 
 162. The number of documents exceeds the number of cases because some cases 
produced more than one document in our sample. 
 163. “Content analysis refers to the systematic reading and analysis of texts.” Lee 
Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical 
Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2070 (2007). In the context 
of legal scholarship, content analysis is typically performed on judicial opinions. See Mark 
A. Hall and Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. 
L. REV. 63, 64–65 (2008). This methodology is also valuable in the analysis of court 
records because it allows us to empirically test scholars’ intuitions about the content of 
court files. See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical 
Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 413 (2010) (noting that content analysis as a methodology allows 
scholars to move beyond anecdotes by generating objective, falsifiable, and reproducible 
data). 
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the sensitive information within the document (e.g., brief body, 
appendix).164 
The selection and identification of sensitive information types was one 
of the central challenges of this study. As we described in Part III, there is 
no single, comprehensive list of private and sensitive information that we 
could utilize at the start of this project. Existing privacy laws, regulations, 
and customs have created a patchwork of inconsistent approaches and 
there is, as yet, no consensus among privacy scholars as to what 
information should be deemed private or sensitive in the context of court 
records.165 Nevertheless, in order to make this study possible, we created a 
list of 140 sensitive information types based on a survey we conducted of 
existing legal authority and privacy scholarship and grouped those 
information types into thirteen categories.166 
Once the documents were coded, we used STATA, a general-purpose 
statistical software package, to determine the frequency of appearance of 
each sensitive information type and to identify relationships, patterns, and 
correlations between different information types and other coded variables, 
including trends over time. A summary of our findings is included in Part 
V.  
To check the reliability of the coding process we conducted two phases 
of testing.167 First, we “pilot tested” a preliminary version of our coding 
form by having our coders review an identical set of five case documents.168 
We also reviewed those documents ourselves and compared the results of 
all coders. This resulted in minor alterations to the coding scheme and 
coder instructions. Second, we conducted a formal test of reliability at the 
conclusion of the coding process by selecting a random sample of fifty 
documents from the 504 documents in the study set.169 We assigned each 
 
 164. The coders used Qualtrics, an online survey platform, to record their 
observations. The coding instrument and codebook are available on the authors’ website. 
See Media Law Resources, UNC CTR. FOR MEDIA L. & POL’Y, http://medialaw.unc.edu/
resources (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).  
 165. See Conley et al., supra note 13, at 775 (concluding that a complex body of rules, 
regulations, principles, and policies govern the creation of court records and access to 
them). 
 166. See supra Part III. 
 167. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 163, at 2074 (noting that reliability 
testing is crucial because “the process of content analysis . . . is inherently subject to some 
level of subjectivity”). 
 168. See LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 101 (2014) (suggesting the use of a “pilot study” to 
pretest content coding schemas). 
 169. There is no bright-line standard dictating the sample size to be used when doing 
reliability testing. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 163, at 2074, n.118 (stating 
 
  
2015] PRIVACY AND COURT RECORDS 1853 
of the documents in this subset to a coder who had not previously coded 
the document. We then compared the results of the two codings in order 
to assess the degree of inter-coder reliability.170 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We begin in this part by presenting descriptive statistical information 
about the court records in our sample and the sensitive information they 
contain. We then examine the extent to which different types of sensitive 
information are related to various case and document characteristics. 
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
1. Sample Summary  
The 504 court records that we reviewed contained a total of 24,156 
pages, with a mean document length of 47.9 pages.171 Table 1 presents a 
breakdown of the various document types that were in our sample, 
including the number of documents with an appendix and the length (in 
pages) for each document type.172 As shown in Table 1, 198 (39%) of these 
documents included an appendix. Not surprisingly, documents that 
contained an appendix were substantially longer (mean length of seventy-
one pages) than documents without an appendix (mean length of thirty-
three pages).173 We also found considerable variability among the 
 
that researchers suggest that at least a ten-percent sample be used) (citing Stephen Lacy 
& Daniel Riffe, Sampling Error and Selecting Intercoder Reliability Samples for Nominal 
Content Categories, 73 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 963, 969–73 (1996)).  
 170. The percentage rate of agreement and “Krippendorff’s alpha,” see KLAUS 
KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS METHODOLOGY 
221–30 (2d ed. 2004), for each of the variables is listed on the coding form, which is 
available on the authors’ website. See Media Law Resources, UNC CTR. FOR MEDIA L. & 
POL’Y, http://medialaw.unc.edu/resources (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
 171. The median document length was thirty-two pages. We report the median 
length in addition to the mean because document length was not normally distributed 
within the sample. The median document length is therefore a better measure of central 
tendency. 
 172. The document types were coded based on the document title on the first page of 
the brief or petition. According to the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
“The Title of the Document should reflect the position of the filing party both at the trial 
level and on the appeal, e.g., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S BRIEF, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE’S BRIEF, or BRIEF FOR THE STATE.” N.C. R. APP. P. app. E (1975). 
“Briefs for the State” are briefs filed by the State of North Carolina as either an appellant 
or appellee; the brief captions do not designate the specific role of the State. 
 173. These results suggest that there is a statistically significant difference between 
the distributions of page lengths for documents with and without an appendix 
(z = -9.372, p = 0.0000). We utilized the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for statistical 
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document types with regard to the inclusion of an appendix. Nearly all 
“Petitions for Discretionary Review” contained an appendix (98%)174 while 
“Briefs for the State” were the least likely document type to include an 
appendix (16%).175 
The most commonly occurring document type in the sample was briefs 
filed by the appellant, which constituted almost half of the documents 
(41%). The sample also included a number of non-party amicus curiae 
briefs (3%), which tended to be the longest documents in the sample. 
Although our sample did not include any reply briefs, we know from our 
review of the North Carolina Supreme Court’s case files that a small 
number of reply briefs also exist in the population under study.176  
 
 
significance because document length was not normally distributed within the sample. 
We return to the importance of the appendices in Part B. 
 174. The high proportion of petitions that included an appendix is likely due to the 
requirements in the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, which state that a 
petition for discretionary review “shall be accompanied by a copy of the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals when filed after determination by that court.” N.C. R. APP. P. 15(c). 
We did not code for the type of documents attached as appendices, so we cannot state 
what proportion of the appendices included only a copy of the lower court’s opinion. 
 175. The difference between these document types with regard to their inclusion of 
appendices is statistically significant (chi-square with five degrees of freedom = 97.9666, 
p = 0.000). 
 176. As with all random sampling approaches, there is a chance that our sample of 
documents did not capture the entire range of characteristics in the population of North 
Carolina Supreme Court records. It is likely, however, that any characteristics that are not 
in the sample appear very infrequently in the target population. Prior to 2009, the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure did not permit the filing of a reply brief unless the 
court requested such a brief or certain special circumstances existed. See N.C. R. APP. P. 
28(h) (1975). 
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Table 1: Frequency of document types in the sample, including the number of 
documents with an appendix [n, (%)] and length (in pages) for each document type.  
 Page Length 
Document Type n Appendix Mean Median  
Brief of Appellant 212 87 (41%) 54.4 34 
Brief of Appellee 140 41 (29%) 37.8 30 
Brief for the State 87 14 (16%) 46.0 30 
Petition for Discretionary Review 46 45 (98%) 46.7 36 
Brief of Amicus Curiae 16 9 (56%) 67.6 36 
Other177 3 2 (67%) 30.7 26 
All Document Types 504 198 (39%) 47.9 32 
Our sample of documents came from cases decided by the North 
Carolina Supreme Court between 1984 and 2000, the years immediately 
preceding the introduction of electronic filing in North Carolina when 
additional rules regarding the redaction of sensitive information took 
effect.178 Table 2 lists the number of documents in the sample by the type 
of case and the year in which the court issued its decision in the case. 
Because we selected a random stratified sample by year, the totals for each 
year are relatively constant, with a spike in the number of documents 
selected from cases decided in 1986 and a drop in documents from 2000. 
Although there was some variation in the proportions each year, nearly 
two-thirds of the documents in the sample came from civil cases (62%), 
slightly more than a third came from criminal cases (36%), and only a 
small proportion (1%) came from juvenile proceedings.179  
 
 177. The sample also included a motion to amend, guardian ad litem’s brief, and 
brief by a cross-appellant. 
 178. See supra note 10 and citations therein. 
 179. Each state has special courts—typically called juvenile courts—that have 
jurisdiction over cases involving children under a specified age. See Juvenile Court, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Juvenile court proceedings are civil as 
opposed to criminal. Id. In North Carolina, “[a] person who has not reached the person’s 
eighteenth birthday and is not married, emancipated, or a member of the Armed Forces 
of the United States” is eligible for juvenile court if the case relates to abuse, neglect, or 
dependency. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-101(14). Persons sixteen years and older who are 
charged with certain criminal violations or infractions are not eligible for juvenile court in 
North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(7) & (27). In our coding of the 
juvenile cases, we did not differentiate between delinquency cases and abuse, neglect, and 
dependency cases. 
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Table 2: Number of documents by case type and year of North Carolina Supreme 
Court’s decision, including overall percentages for each case type. 
Case Type
Year Civil Criminal Juvenile Total
1984 9 11 1 21
1985 16 12 0 28
1986 20 21 0 41
1987 23 11 1 35
1988 15 15 1 31
1989 11 12 0 23
1990 19 11 1 31
1991 24 10 0 34
1992 23 10 1 34
1993 20 9 0 29
1994 20 17 0 37
1995 23 9 0 32
1996 23 11 0 34
1997 20 10 1 31
1998 21 6 0 27
1999 18 5 1 24
2000 8 4 0 12
Total 313 (62%) 184 (36%) 7 (1%) 504
The cases themselves covered a wide variety of subject areas, ranging 
from appeals challenging death penalty sentences to workers’ 
compensation determinations. To facilitate the coding of case subject 
areas, we adopted the twelve appellate case type designations created by 
the Court Statistics Project at the National Center for State Courts.180 Not 
surprisingly, given that nearly two-thirds of the documents in our sample 
came from civil cases, the most commonly occurring appellate subject area 
 
 180. The appellate case types are: (1) Death Penalty; (2) Felony (non-Death Penalty); 
(3) Misdemeanor; (4) Criminal-Other; (5) Tort, Contract, and Real Property; (6) 
Probate; (7) Family; (8) Juvenile; (9) Civil-Other; (10) Workers’ Compensation; (11) 
Revenue (Tax); and (12) Administrative Agency-Other. See COURT STATISTICS 
PROJECT, STATE COURT GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING 39–44 (2014), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/State%20Court%20Guide
%20to%20Statistical%20Reporting%20v%20211.pdf. The Court Statistics Project at the 
National Center for State Courts created these categories in order to provide a 
“standardized reporting framework for state court caseload statistics designed to promote 
intelligent comparisons among state courts.” Id. at 1. 
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was “tort, contract, and real property,” which constituted 32% of the 
documents in our sample. The next most common subject area was “felony 
(non-death penalty),” which arose in 26% of the documents, followed by 
appeals of administrative agency decisions, which appeared in nearly 9% of 
the documents in the sample. Documents from death penalty cases 
constituted 7% of the sample, yet they contained more than a quarter 
(28%) of the sensitive information we found.181  
2. Sensitive Information Summary  
Although a wide variety of sensitive information appears in the court 
records we sampled, it is not uniformly distributed throughout the records. 
Most of the documents contained relatively few incidences of sensitive 
information while a handful of documents contained a large number of 
pieces of sensitive information. Figure 1 presents a histogram of the 
frequency of sensitive information per document. It shows a pronounced 
rightward skew indicating that sensitive information is not “normally” 
distributed throughout the records.182 In other words, the histogram is 
asymmetrical and does not have the classic bell shaped curve that would 
indicate that most documents fall within the middle of the range. Instead, 
the vast majority of documents contained fewer than forty pieces of 
sensitive information while only a few documents contained more than 
400 pieces of sensitive information. At the far right of the graph we see 
that several documents contained more than 1,000 pieces of sensitive 
information. Overall, the records we reviewed contained an average of 113 
appearances of sensitive information per document, with a median of 
thirty-six appearances of sensitive information.183  
We saw considerable variation in the frequency of sensitive 
information among the different document and case types. Table 3 
presents the median frequency of sensitive information by document type 
along with the location (brief body or appendix) where the information 
appeared.184 Figure 2 presents similar information by case type.  
 
 181. We discuss the potential implications of this finding in Section VI.A.3.  
 182. A rightward skew is when the long tail is on the right side of the peak, which is 
also called a positive skew. 
 183. The standard deviation for the frequency of sensitive information coded per 
document is 209.07 and the interquartile range, covering the middle 50% of the observed 
frequencies, is 11–122. 
 184. The difference in the frequency of sensitive information between brief bodies 
and appendices is statistically significant (paired t-test with 104 degrees of freedom 
= -3.5484, p = 0.0006). We report the median frequency in Tables 3 and 4, rather than 
the mean, because the frequency of sensitive information was not normally distributed. 
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Figure 1: Histogram of frequency of sensitive information per document overlaid with 
kernel density plot. 
 
Table 3: Median frequency of sensitive information coded per document, listed by 
document type and location within the document. 
Figure 2 presents similar information by case type and reveals that 
criminal cases had substantially more sensitive information per document 
than either civil or juvenile cases. In fact, the median frequency of sensitive 
information in documents filed in criminal cases was approximately five 
times that of documents filed in either civil or juvenile cases. Figure 2 also 
reveals that in criminal and juvenile cases, sensitive information appeared 
Median Frequency of Sensitive Information 
Document Type Brief Body Appendix Overall 
Brief for the State 96.0 30.0 105.5 
Brief of Appellant 39.0 24.0 42.0 
Petition for Discretionary Review 14.5 17.0 22.0 
Brief of Appellee 12.5 10.5 12.0 
Brief of Amicus Curiae 8.0 215.5 10.5 
Other 6.5 3.0 8.0 
All Document Types 29.0 19.0 36.0 
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much more frequently in the brief body than in the appendix. In civil 
cases, sensitive information appeared with equal frequency in both 
appendices and briefs. We return to the role of appendices in Section V.B. 
 
Figure 2: Dot plot of median frequency of sensitive information per document, by case 
type and location within the document. 
As we noted in Part III, we grouped the specific sensitive information 
types into thirteen categories in order to facilitate comparisons between 
sensitive information types that shared similar characteristics. Table 4 
reports the number of documents in the sample that contained sensitive 
information falling within each of these information categories. As Table 
4 shows, information types in the “location” category appeared in more 
documents than any other category, appearing in 67% of the documents in 
the sample. Information in the “identity” and “criminal proceedings” 
categories also appeared in more than half of the documents, occurring in 
66% and 56% of the documents, respectively. Overall, information in 
seven of the thirteen categories appeared in at least 20% of the 
documents.185 Information in each of the remaining six categories 
appeared in fewer than 8% of the documents.  
 
 185. We break down the specific information types within these categories in Section 
V.B. 
  
1860 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:3  
Table 4: Number of documents that contained sensitive information, listed by category 
of sensitive information, including the percentage of the total sample size (n = 504) and 
median number of times per document that information in that category appeared. 
Documents in Sample Median 
Information Category n % Per Doc 
Location 336 67% 4
Identity 331 66% 3
Criminal Proceedings 280 56% 54.5 
Health 205 41% 5
Assets 175 35% 6
Financial Information 134 27% 4
Civil Proceedings 103 20% 4
No sensitive information 37 7% -
Employment 33 7% 4
Sexual Activities 31 6% 6
Intellectual Pursuits 23 5% 4
Education 6 1% 3.5 
Images 1 0% 17 
Computer Use 0 0% -
A few categories stand out in Table 4 because of their relative absence 
in the documents. Information about “sexual activities” appeared 
infrequently, as did information in the “intellectual pursuits” category, 
which includes religious beliefs, political opinions, and voting and reading 
records. Information about “education” was also mostly absent from the 
documents as were photos and videos captured by the “images” category. 
None of the documents contained any sensitive information in the 
“computer use” category (e.g., user names, passwords, and search history). 
Moreover, thirty-seven documents in the sample (7%) did not contain any 
of the sensitive information types that we coded for in this project.186 
Table 4 also presents the median number of times per document that 
information in each category appeared. For most of the information 
categories, sensitive information appeared between three and six times per 
document. There are two outliers, however. Information in the “criminal 
proceedings” category appeared far more frequently in the documents than 
any other category (median appearance per document of 54.5), showing up 
approximately nine to eighteen times as often as information in the other 
categories. The “images” category was the other outlier, with a median of 
 
 186. A full list of the information types we coded is included in the Appendix. 
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seventeen appearances of sensitive information per document.187 Although 
sensitive information in the “images” and “sexual activities” categories did 
not appear in very many documents, when they did appear, they generally 
did so with greater frequency than information in all of the other 
categories excluding “criminal proceedings.” 
B. ANALYSIS 
It would be of little value to the debate over privacy and public access 
to simply add up the total number of times that various types of sensitive 
information appeared in court records. Indeed, we knew going into this 
study that court records are replete with sensitive information. Instead, in 
reporting and interpreting the results, we focus on the relative differences 
between document types, case types, and information categories rather 
than on the absolute numbers.  
As noted in Part III and discussed more fully below, we purposefully 
coded a broad range of sensitive information types. Not all of the 
information that we identified presents the same privacy concerns. In the 
following sections we discuss the types of sensitive information that we 
found in the documents and examine the context in which they appeared. 
1. Variations Within and Among Information Categories 
Not surprisingly, the court records did not contain every category or 
type of sensitive information in equal measure. As Table 4 shows, 
information relating to location, identity, criminal proceedings, health, 
assets, finances, and civil proceedings appeared in many more documents 
than information that falls within the remaining six categories. We 
observed the same “top seven” categories of information when we 
calculated the total frequency of sensitive information throughout all of 
the records, but in a slightly different order.188 For example, although the 
criminal proceedings category was only the third most frequently 
occurring information category on a per document basis (information 
types in this category appeared in 56% of the documents) it far exceeded 
every other category of information on the basis of total frequency of 
 
 187. This may be due to the fact that only one document in the sample contained 
information that fell within this category. A sub-sample consisting of only a single 
observation is too small to be statistically significant. 
 188. The top seven categories in terms of total appearance of sensitive information 
were criminal proceedings (n = 38,136), health (3,549), identity (3,217), assets (2,385), 
location (2,128), civil proceedings (1,428), and financial information (1,097). 
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appearance.189 In other words, information related to criminal proceedings 
not only appeared in most court records, it also appeared more often in 
those records than any other category of sensitive information.  
We might speculate that information related to criminal proceedings 
appears more frequently because criminal cases may be more common 
than civil cases. Documents from criminal cases, however, made up only 
36% of the sample,190 so the higher frequency of criminal information is 
not due to a larger number of criminal documents. Instead, criminal 
information was dispersed across all of the document types and case types. 
It is not just criminal cases that contain criminal information; this 
information appeared in a wide variety of contexts. We consider this 
further in the next section.  
Turning to the individual information types in each of the most 
frequently occurring information categories, we saw a general pattern in 
the distribution of sensitive information. Figure 3 presents dot plots for 
the eight most frequently occurring information categories.191 In each 
category, a few information types appeared far more often than the other 
information types in that category. This pattern was most evident for the 
financial information category, where information about an individual’s 
compensation far outnumbered the other types of financial information in 
terms of frequency of appearance in court records.192 This pattern was less 
pronounced for the assets and location categories, which had three and 
four types respectively of sensitive information that constituted more than 
10% of their category’s total. For the criminal proceedings and civil 
proceedings categories, the distribution was also more evenly spread; both 
of these categories had at least three information types that comprised 
10% or more of their category’s total.193  
 
 189. Information in the criminal proceedings category appeared 38,136 times in the 
sample. Information in the next highest category, health, had an overall frequency of 
appearance of 3,549. The substantially higher number of median appearances per 
document of information related to criminal proceedings as shown in Table 4 suggests 
this disparity as well.  
 190. See Table 2. 
 191. We present dot plots for the eight most frequently occurring categories, rather 
than just the top seven categories, to make full use of the space available in Figure 3. 
Note that the horizontal axes for these plots varied from a maximum frequency of 250 
(for the “employment” category) to 15,000 (for the “criminal proceedings” category). The 
axes were presented in this way in order to allow clearer comparisons of frequency within 
each category. 
 192. There were surprisingly few incidences of bank account numbers (n = 9), credit 
card numbers (2), or other financial account numbers (4) in the sample. See Figure 3.  
 193. The criminal proceedings category dwarfed all other categories in terms of 
overall frequency of appearance. Unlike the other categories, six information types in the 
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As Figure 3 confirms, the criminal proceedings category far exceeded 
every other category of information on the basis of total frequency of 
sensitive information in the court records. Names of witnesses in criminal 
cases appeared more often than any other coded information type, 
followed somewhat distantly by the name of an individual who was the 
subject of a criminal investigation. The name of a victim of criminal 
activity other than rape (rape victim name is a separate information type) 
was the third most frequently occurring information type in the criminal 
proceedings category—and the third most frequently occurring 
information type overall. It is not until after the fifth most frequently 
occurring criminal information type, “conviction,” that information in the 
other categories begin to place in the rankings of most frequently 
occurring sensitive information types.  
 
Figure 3A: Frequency of individual information types in the most commonly occurring 
categories of sensitive information. 
 
criminal proceedings category appeared more than 1,000 times and three types of 
sensitive information appeared more than 4,900 times. See Figure 3. 
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Figure 3B: Frequency of individual information types in the most commonly occurring 
categories of sensitive information. 
The higher frequency of information related to criminal proceedings 
could be due to the fact that documents filed in criminal cases were, on 
average, longer than documents filed in other types of cases.194 We would 
naturally expect longer documents to have more sensitive information. 
The data support this intuition, although the relationship between 
document length and frequency of sensitive information only partially 
explains the variations in the documents. Figure 4 presents a scatterplot of 
total sensitive information per document as a function of document length 
(in pages). The line through the scatterplot is the best-fitting linear 
regression line that provides an estimate of the relationship between the 
frequency of sensitive information in a document and the document’s 
length.  
 
 194. Documents associated with criminal cases were on average 11.6 pages longer 
than civil cases: criminal cases had a mean [median] document length of 55.5 [36] pages 
compared to 43.9 [30] pages for documents filed in civil cases. Juvenile cases had on 
average the shortest documents, with a mean [median] of 32.3 [36] pages.  
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Figure 4: Scatterplot of frequency of sensitive information per document on document 
length (in pages) with linear regression line. 
We draw several conclusions from Figure 4. First, the relationship 
between total frequency of sensitive information in a document and 
document length is positive (as documents get longer, we can expect to 
find more sensitive information). Second, the overall ratio is 
approximately 1:3 (for each additional page in length, we can expect to 
find approximately three more pieces of sensitive information).195 
Although as Figure 4 demonstrates, document length is an important 
indicator of the frequency of sensitive information in a court record, it 
accounts for only an estimated 33% of the variation in total frequency of 
sensitive information in the documents.196 In other words, other 
independent variables, either alone or in combination, are likely to have a 
 
 195. Utilizing ordinary least squares, the regression model’s coefficient for page 
length was 3.363195 (n = 52,998, std. err. = 0.0205702, R2 = 0.3299, p-value = 0.000).  
 196. The linear regression model used in Figure 4 produces an estimate, known as 
the coefficient of determination (R2), of the fit between the model’s prediction of the 
number of appearances of sensitive information in a document as a function of page 
length and the actual frequency of sensitive information. For Figure 4, R2 was 0.3299. 
This estimate tells us the percentage of the variance in the frequency of sensitive 
information explained by the model is 32.99%. 
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more substantial effect than page length on the frequency of sensitive 
information in a court record.197  
Indeed, there are signs that other factors are at work when we look at 
scatterplots comparing the frequency of sensitive information as a function 
of document length across the three different case types. As Figure 5 
shows, criminal cases had a higher density of sensitive information per 
page than either civil or juvenile cases. As page length increased, the 
number of pieces of sensitive information in criminal cases increased at a 
higher rate than it did in civil and juvenile cases. For criminal cases, the 
ratio between page length and frequency of sensitive information was 
roughly 1:4.198 For civil cases, the ratio was approximately 1:1.199 
 
Figure 5: Scatterplot of frequency of sensitive information per document on document 
length (in pages) by case type with linear regression lines. 
 
 197. We report on the results of our multiple regression model in Part V.B.4. 
 198. Utilizing ordinary least squares, the regression model’s coefficient for page 
length in criminal cases is 4.012137 (n = 40,440, std. err. = 0.0235338, R2 = 0.4182, 
p-value = 0.000). 
 199. Utilizing ordinary least squares, the regression model’s coefficient for page 
length in civil cases is 0.9802669 (n = 12,423, std. err.  = 0.014221, R2 = 0.2767, p-value = 
0.000). There were too few documents from juvenile cases (n = 7) to draw any 
conclusions about the relationship between document length and frequency of sensitive 
information. 
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2. Contextual Variations 
We turn now to the question of whether certain contextual factors 
influence—or at least are correlated with—the types of sensitive 
information found in court records. We coded for a number of case and 
document characteristics that might be linked to the appearance of 
sensitive information, including case type, case subject area, document 
type, subject of the information (adult or minor), location of the 
information (brief body or appendix), and year of case decision.200 As the 
preceding discussion noted, we have already seen some variability in the 
types and extent of sensitive information associated with criminal cases, so 
we will start by analyzing the role that case type plays in the appearance of 
sensitive information.  
a) Case Types 
We know from Figures 2 and 5 that criminal cases have, on average, 
more sensitive information than civil and juvenile cases, but we cannot tell 
from those figures which types of sensitive information are more prevalent 
in criminal cases. Figure 6 presents the percentage of sensitive information 
in civil and criminal cases by category of sensitive information.201 From 
Figure 6 we can discern some important differences about the extent of 
sensitive information in civil and criminal cases.  
First, sensitive information is not uniformly distributed in all types of 
cases. The top bar in Figure 6 shows that overall, approximately 75% of 
the sensitive information we identified appeared in documents filed in 
criminal cases. Many of the information categories, however, deviated 
substantially from this 75/25 split.  
In civil cases, we found a significantly higher proportion of sensitive 
information in the assets, civil proceedings, employment, financial, and 
location categories. In fact, sensitive information in the employment and 
financial categories appeared almost entirely in civil cases (92% and 94% of 
the time respectively). Sensitive information in the health, identity, and 
intellectual pursuits categories, on the other hand, appeared more 
frequently in documents associated with criminal cases, and information in 
the education and images categories appeared only in criminal cases. Only 
 
 200. Other contextual factors may also be relevant, but our focus here is on the case 
and document characteristics that courts themselves use in their filing systems. 
 201. Figure 6 does not include documents from juvenile cases because they were too 
few in number to warrant graphing. 
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information in the health and sexual activities categories appeared in 
roughly equal measure in both civil and criminal cases.  
 
Figure 6: Horizontal bar graph showing percentage of sensitive information in civil and 
criminal cases by category of sensitive information. 
Second, not only did criminal cases evidence more sensitive 
information than civil and juvenile cases, they also contained a greater 
variety of sensitive information. Criminal cases contained sensitive 
information from all of the categories we found in the documents,202 
whereas information from two categories, education and images, were 
absent from civil cases.203 We also found that overall, criminal cases 
contained more types of sensitive information. Of the 140 sensitive 
information types we coded for in the records, ninety-five distinct types 
actually appeared in the documents. Although some types appeared 
exclusively, or nearly so, in civil cases, documents filed in criminal cases 
contained a greater variety of sensitive information types. Table 5 lists the 
information types that appeared in documents associated with only one 
 
 202. We did not find any information in the documents that fell within the 
“computer use” category. See supra Part III.B.3 (describing the information types in this 
category). 
 203. Six of the thirteen information categories were absent from documents filed in 
juvenile cases. 
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case type at least 90% of the time.204 As Table 5 shows, criminal cases had 
a greater variety of sensitive information types than civil cases. 
Table 5: Information types that appeared in documents associated with only one case 
type at least 90% of the time. 
Civil Cases Criminal Cases
Adoption 
Bank Account Number 
Bankruptcy 
Cable Television Subscription 
Record 
Child Support 
Compensation 
Debt 
Discipline 
Driver’s License Number 
Foreclosure Judgment 
Insurance Policy Number 
Paternity Test 
Performance Evaluation 
Political Opinion 
Prior Civil Judgment 
Professional Cert. or License 
Number 
SSN - Full 
State ID Number 
Tax Lien 
Tax Return 
Voting Record 
Abortion 
Arrest or Charge 
Child Abuse 
Communicable Disease 
Content of Recorded Conversations 
Conviction 
Credit Card Number 
Drug or Alcohol Treatment 
Full-Face Photograph 
Genetic Information 
Gun Possession or Ownership 
Incarceration 
Informant Name 
Juror Name 
Juvenile Court History 
Military Discharge 
Name of Subject of Investigation 
Parole Status 
Photos or Videos of Violence, 
Abuse or Death 
Presentence Investigation Report 
Rape Victim Name 
Sentence 
Sexual Abuse Allegation 
Student Discipline 
Student Grades or Performance 
Evaluation 
Vehicle License Plate Number 
Video Rental Records
 
 204. None of the sensitive information types we coded for appeared more than 10% 
of the time in juvenile cases. There were several information types, however, that were 
disproportionately common in juvenile cases: “Adoption,” “Custody or Guardianship,” 
“Date of Birth,” “Juvenile Court History,” “Name of Minor Child,” “Pregnancy,” and 
“Sex Life.” 
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b) Adults and Minors 
Most of the sensitive information we found was associated with adults. 
Overall, only 7% of the sensitive information we coded was associated 
with an identified minor,205 and the difference between civil and criminal 
cases with regard to sensitive information associated with minors was 
modest (information about minors appeared 6.1% and 7.2% of the time 
respectively). The percentage of sensitive information about minors was 
significantly higher in juvenile cases, where 40% of the information that 
we coded was associated with an identified minor.  
Although appeals from juvenile cases are now subject to additional 
privacy protections under the North Carolina Rules of Appellate 
Procedure,206 these protections were not in place during the time period 
we studied and we found a considerable amount of sensitive information 
in juvenile cases that was associated with an identified minor. Documents 
in juvenile cases contained an average of 10.27 pieces of sensitive 
information connected to an identified minor, with the following 
information types being the most common: “Name of Minor Child,”207 
“Rape Victim Name,” “Adoption,” “Age,” “Arrest or Charge,” and “Other 
Health Diagnosis or Treatment.”208  
We also found a few interesting differences between the information 
categories with regard to minors across all of the case types. Relative to 
their baseline percentages, minors were less likely to be associated with 
 
 205. For our purposes, an identified minor was any individual under the age of 
eighteen years, regardless of whether he or she met the requirements for juvenile court 
jurisdiction under North Carolina law. See supra note 179 (describing the jurisdictional 
requirements for juvenile court in North Carolina). 
 206. In 2006, the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure were amended to 
provide additional privacy protections for juveniles. The current rules state that “covered 
juveniles . . . shall be referenced only by the use of initials or pseudonyms in briefs, 
petitions, and all other filings, and shall be similarly redacted from all documents, 
exhibits, appendixes, or arguments submitted with such filings” and that a “juvenile’s 
address and social security number shall be excluded from all filings, documents, exhibits, 
or arguments with the exception of sealed verbatim transcripts.” N.C. R. APP. P. 3.1(b).  
 207. As we noted in Part III.B, we coded for “Name of Minor Child” as a specific 
information type; this information type made up nearly 3% of the total frequency of all 
sensitive information in the records. 
 208. We did not record whether the minor in question was a “covered juvenile” under 
North Carolina law, so we cannot state whether the information we found would violate 
North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.1(b). We can state, however, that we 
found no appearances in juvenile cases of addresses or social security numbers associated 
with minors. As we note in Part VI.A.4, the number of documents in our sample from 
juvenile cases was relatively small (n = 7), so we recommend further research on the 
privacy risks associated with minors. 
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information related to criminal proceedings (3.7%) and more likely to be 
associated with information in the education (33.3%), health (10.5%), 
identity (12.9%), and sexual activities (16.0%) categories.  
There also were intriguing variations in the relative proportions of 
some of the specific information types with regard to minors. Figure 7 
shows the percentage of sensitive information associated with adults and 
minors for the seventeen information types that were identified with 
minors more than 10% of the time. As Figure 7 reveals, a number of 
information types were disproportionately associated with minors (i.e., 
their association with minors was substantially greater than would have 
been expected based on the overall frequency of sensitive information 
associated with minors). Information about communicable diseases and 
minor names, for example, were exclusively identified with minors, and 
seven of the seventeen information types appeared more than 30% of the 
time in relation to a minor.  
 
Figure 7: Horizontal bar graph showing percentage of sensitive information types 
associated with adults and minors. Only information types associated with minors more 
than 10% of the time are listed. 
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c) Appendices 
Some scholars and archivists have suggested that appendices included 
in court records contain more sensitive information than legal briefs,209 but 
our data did not bear this out. As we reported in Section V.A, we found 
that overall, brief bodies contained a higher frequency of sensitive 
information than appendices.210 As the dot plot in Figure 2 showed, this 
disparity was particularly evident in criminal and juvenile cases; for civil 
cases, sensitive information appeared with equal frequency in both the 
appendices and brief bodies.211  
Several information types, however, were more prevalent in 
appendices. Figure 8 lists the information types that appeared more than 
30% of the time in appendices. Of the ninety-five information types we 
identified in the documents, sixteen appeared more than 30% of the time 
in an appendix, a marked deviation from the overall proportion of sensitive 
information in appendices (14%) as shown in the top bar in Figure 8. 
Moreover, seven information types appeared more than 50% of the time in 
an appendix, and three types appeared only in the appendices: “SSN - 
Full,” “State ID Number,” and “Video Rental Records.”  
As Figure 8 shows, only seven of the ninety-five information types that 
we identified in the records appeared more often in appendices. On the 
other hand, twenty-seven information types appeared exclusively in the 
brief bodies, including: “Abortion,” “Adoption,” “Bankruptcy,” 
“Communicable Disease,” “Credit Card Number,” “Dependency or 
Neglect,” “Drug and Alcohol Treatment,” “Genetic Information,” 
“Juvenile Court History,” “Parole Status,” “Paternity,” “Student Grades or 
Performance,” “Tax Lien,” “Vehicle License Plate Number,” and “Voting 
Record.” Recall that nearly 40% of the documents contained an 
appendix.212 Although there was substantial variability among the different 
 
 209. See, e.g., Whiteman, supra note 17, at 470, 477 (describing the Northern 
Kentucky Law Library’s decision to refrain from scanning appendices to briefs filed in the 
Kentucky Supreme Court); Hinderman, supra note 18, at 6 (noting that the Montana 
State Law Library pulled electronic court records it had already posted online to remove 
all exhibits and appendices before reposting the briefs). 
 210. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 211. The median frequency of sensitive information in briefs and appendices filed in 
criminal cases was 113 and 41, respectively; for juvenile cases, the median frequency of 
sensitive information was 17 and 6.5, respectively. The median frequency of sensitive 
information in briefs and appendices filed in civil cases was 16.  
 212. See supra Table 1.  
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document types with regard to the inclusion of an appendix,213 the 
variation between case types with regard to appendices was less 
pronounced and the differences were not statistically significant.214 
Accordingly, we can conclude that it is not a dearth of documents with 
appendices in our sample that is suppressing the appearance of sensitive 
information in the appendices. We will return to the role of appendices in 
Part VI. 
 
Figure 8: Horizontal bar graph showing percentage of sensitive information types in 
appendices and brief bodies. Only information types that appeared more than 30% of the 
time in appendices are listed.  
3. Temporal Variations 
Our final contextual factor is time. Following the approach of the 
North Carolina Supreme Court, which maintains its case files based on 
the year a case is decided by the court, we assigned the corresponding case 
year to each document in our sample. Figure 9 graphs the total number of 
 
 213. Nearly all petitions for discretionary review contained an appendix (98%) while 
briefs by the state were the least likely document type to include an appendix (16%). See 
supra Table 1. 
 214. Overall, 40% of civil cases included an appendix and 35% of criminal cases 
included an appendix. See supra Table 1. As noted in the text, the difference between the 
various case types with regard to the inclusion of appendices was not statistically 
significant (chi-square with 2 degrees of freedom = 2.1090, p = 0.348).  
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documents in our sample by year, as well as the number of documents that 
did not contain any of the sensitive information types we coded for. As 
Figure 9 shows, there was considerable year-to-year variation in both of 
these measurements.  
 
Figure 9: Total number of documents in sample and number of documents without 
sensitive information, by year. 
We also found substantial variation in the total frequency of sensitive 
information per year. Figure 10 presents a two-way area graph of the total 
appearance of sensitive information by year as well as for the four most 
frequently occurring information categories: criminal proceedings, health, 
identity, and location. As Table 10 indicates, the total amount of sensitive 
information ranged from a low of 1,068 in 1984 to high of 6,052 in 1994, 
with an average of 3,117.5 pieces of sensitive information per year during 
the seventeen-year period under study.215  
From Figure 10 we can see that in addition to variation in the overall 
frequency of sensitive information per year, the individual categories of 
sensitive information also varied during this time period. Not surprisingly, 
 
 215. The median frequency of sensitive information per year is 2,922; standard 
deviation is 1,700.3; and the interquartile range, covering the middle 50% of the observed 
frequencies, is 1,617–4,727.  
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information related to criminal proceedings tracked the overall totals quite 
closely (this is not surprising because the vast majority of sensitive 
information each year was associated with the criminal proceedings 
category). The other categories showed some variability as well, but did 
not parallel as closely the timing of the changes in the overall total. For 
example, the health category varied from a high of 626 in 1987 to a low of 
forty-four in 1997; the identity category varied from a high of 458 in 1995 
to a low of fifty-seven in 1998; and the location category varied from a 
high of 305 in 1985 to a low of two in 1992. 
 
Figure 10: Total appearance of sensitive information by year of case decision including 
the 4 most frequently occurring information categories. 
If we compare Figures 9 and 10, we might surmise that at least some 
of this variation is due to the fluctuations in the number of documents in 
our sample from each year. To remove this factor from our analysis, we 
calculated the frequency of appearance of the various categories on a per 
document basis. Figure 11 presents this measure of “sensitive information 
density” for the six most frequently occurring information categories. 
Figure 11 suggests that there was no overarching trend in the 
appearance of sensitive information during the 1984 to 2000 time period. 
Instead, the numbers vary within a relatively constant range. It should be 
noted that the individual line graphs in Figure 11 do not all utilize the 
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same y-axis scale. The criminal proceedings category varied between 
twenty and 120 pieces of sensitive information per document whereas the 
location and civil proceedings categories varied between zero and ten. By 
varying the y-axis scale, Figure 11 allows us to compare the relative 
changes in sensitive information density within each category over time 
and leads to two important observations.  
 
Figure 11: Sensitive information per document by year of case decision for the six most 
frequently occurring information categories. 
First, there was considerable variability both within the categories and 
among the categories during this time period. None of the categories 
evidenced a consistent amount of sensitive information per document on a 
year-to-year basis. In some years there were sharp increases in the amount 
of sensitive information associated with these categories while in other 
years there were steep declines. For example, the amount of sensitive 
information per document in the health category spiked in 1987 and 1984 
and fell in 1990 and 1997, whereas the identity category showed sharp 
increases in 1986 and 1995 and declines in 1990 and 1998. Moreover, the 
peaks and valleys evident in the individual graphs in Figure 11 do not 
align. When some categories were peaking, others were dipping.  
Second, we do not see either a declining or rising trend for these 
categories. Although there is a pronounced increase in sensitive 
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information per document beginning in 1998 for the criminal proceedings, 
health, and identity categories, the location and civil proceedings 
categories declined during that same period, and overall the five-year 
moving averages for all of the categories show no discernable trend. From 
Figure 9 we can see that the upswing in sensitive information for the 
criminal, health, and identity categories in 1998 occurred during a period 
when the total number of documents was declining. Whether this increase 
in sensitive information continued after 2000 is beyond the scope of this 
study. 
4. Regression Analysis 
In this section we use multiple regression analysis to examine whether 
and to what extent certain document and case characteristics influence the 
amount of sensitive information in court records. As we previously noted, 
document length is a statistically significant predictor of the amount of 
sensitive information in a court record.216 Recall that the linear regression 
line shown in the scatterplot of sensitive information per document in 
Figure 4 provided an estimate of the relationship between the frequency of 
sensitive information in a document and the document’s length.217 We 
now add other independent variables to our analysis in order to better 
predict the amount of sensitive information in court records.  
Figure 12 presents a nomogram of the multiple regression coefficients 
for the analysis of the frequency of sensitive information per document 
(log transformed) for nine independent case and document variables.218 It 
shows that six independent variables—criminal case type, appellant’s brief, 
appellee’s brief, petition for discretionary review, state’s brief, and 
document length (in pages)—are statistically significant predictors of the 
total amount of sensitive information in a document because their 95% 
 
 216. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 217. The best fitting linear regression line in Figure 4 predicted a relationship of 
approximately 1:3 between document length and frequency of sensitive information, with 
a coefficient of determination, R2, of 0.3299. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 218. We utilized a log transformation of the total amount of sensitive information 
per document because this variable is not normally distributed. Each parameter estimate 
in Figure 12 is represented by a dot along with the 95% confidence interval for the 
estimate depicted by a horizontal line. Parameters with narrower confidence intervals are 
estimated more precisely than those with wider confidence intervals. Only those 
parameters with a confidence interval that does not cross zero are statistically significant 
at a 95% level. Figure 12 does not include the intercept parameter, which has a coefficient 
of 0.6542635 [95% CI: -1.089448 to 2.397975]. 
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confidence intervals do not cross zero.219 In other words, holding all other 
variables in the model constant, the amount of sensitive information in a 
document can be predicted based on the document’s length, the type of 
brief (other than an amicus brief), and whether it was filed in a criminal 
case. The other variables listed in Figure 12 may also influence the amount 
of sensitive information in a document, but the findings from the multiple 
regression model do not show that we can be sufficiently confident to 
assess what effect, if any, they have on the amount of sensitive 
information. 
 
Figure 12: Nomogram of multiple regression parameters and 95% confidence intervals 
for the analysis of sensitive information per document (log transformed) listed by case 
and document variables. 
What the multiple regression model tells us is that, other things being 
equal, criminal cases contain significantly more pieces of sensitive 
information per document than civil cases (coef. = 1.55, p = 0.000). In 
addition, appellee briefs (coef. = 1.92, p = 0.032), petitions for 
discretionary review (coef. = 1.95, p = 0.030), briefs by the state (coef. = 
 
 219. The model’s other relevant statistics include F(9,457) = 43.71, p < 0.0000, R2 = 
0.4626. All six independent variables described in the text added statistically significantly 
to the prediction, p < 0.05. The full regression table is included in the Appendix. 
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2.23, p = 0.013), and appellant briefs (coef. = 2.32, p = 0.009) contain 
significantly more pieces of sensitive information than the other briefs 
category (reference group), with the relative impact of the various brief 
types increasing as their coefficients increase. It also tells us that the 
number of pages in a document is another significant predictor of sensitive 
information. The more pages in a document, the more pieces of sensitive 
information appear in the document (coef. = 0.01, p = 0.000). As for the 
inclusion of an appendix, the model shows that this does not predict the 
overall frequency of sensitive information in the document.  
This final point about the lack of impact of appendices may strike 
some readers as surprising, but given our earlier finding that brief bodies 
contain a higher median frequency of sensitive information—as well as a 
wider variety of sensitive information types—than appendices,220 it is not 
unexpected.221 We will return to the implications of these findings in Part 
VI. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCESS POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES  
As we noted in the introduction, courts and libraries are moving 
quickly to digitize court records and make them available online. The 
results of this study will, we hope, inform these efforts by providing much-
needed detail about the extent and context of sensitive information in 
these important public records. In this part we discuss how our study can 
aid the ongoing debate about privacy and court records and how our 
results can help to identify and remedy potential implementation 
challenges if courts or archivists decide to carry out privacy management 
protocols. 
It is not our goal in this Article to tell courts or archivists what 
information, if any, should be redacted or what documents should be 
withheld from online access or otherwise managed for privacy protection. 
These largely normative questions must be answered based on a careful 
balancing of the competing public access and privacy interests. Moreover, 
the privacy interests cannot be evaluated based solely on the presence or 
absence of specific types of sensitive information in individual court 
records. Other factors, including what one can learn or infer about 
individuals from other sources, as well as the value to society of the 
 
 220. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 221. Another possible explanation is that the inclusion of an appendix is highly 
correlated with page length. 
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information in question, must also be taken into account. The data we 
present will be invaluable in doing this evaluation, but our findings should 
not be read to dictate one approach or another. 
As discussed in Part IV, our sample of court documents came from a 
large corpus of briefs and other filings submitted to the North Carolina 
Supreme Court spanning the time period 1984 to 2000.222 Although our 
results are specific to this population of court records, we believe that the 
data we collected shed light on court records held by other state appellate 
courts, particularly courts of last resort.223  
Trial court records, however, are a different story. It is unlikely that 
our findings are generalizable to the records held by trial courts. Unlike 
appellate courts, which are primarily engaged in deciding questions of law, 
trial courts must resolve competing factual claims. As a result, their files 
likely contain a higher frequency of sensitive information from a wider 
array of records,224 including pre-trial discovery materials, expert reports, 
juror questionnaires, court transcripts, physical evidence, and audiovisual 
materials.225 Nevertheless, the methods we used in coding and analyzing 
the North Carolina Supreme Court’s records could be applied to trial 
court records as well, and we hope that other researchers will do so.  
 
 222. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. We did not review the “record on 
appeal,” which is a separate filing containing, inter alia, copies of the case pleadings, jury 
instructions, transcripts, and other evidence entered in the lower courts.  
 223. Unfortunately, we could not find any data comparing state court appellate 
caseloads during the time period we studied. The National Center for State Courts 
(NCSC) did not implement the State Court Guide to Statistical Reporting until 2007, see 
supra note 180, and has not reclassified its historical data using the new reporting schema 
outlined in the guide. See Email to David Ardia from Shauna M. Strickland, Senior 
Court Research Analyst, NCSC, dated July 1, 2015 (on file with authors). Because of 
this, we cannot match our results with the data reported by other states during the time 
period we studied. We hope that other researchers will collect the data needed to do such 
comparisons. 
 224. We are aware of no comprehensive studies of trial court records. Carl Malamud, 
who used software to search for unredacted social security numbers in federal district 
court filings on PACER, noted that “often when our tool reported a Social Security 
number violation, when we looked around the document we also picked up many other 
Social Security numbers, birth dates, driver license numbers, Alien IDs, and bank account 
numbers.” Malamud Letter, supra note 6, at 1. 
 225. Some of these materials may end up in an appellate court’s files if they are 
submitted as part of the record on appeal, but rarely do they appear to the same extent in 
the parties’ briefs and appendices. See Conley et al., supra note 13, at 776 (noting that 
trial court records “contain an abundance of personal information, some of which may 
drop away as cases move from trial courts to appellate courts”). 
  
2015] PRIVACY AND COURT RECORDS 1881 
A. IDENTIFYING WHERE PRIVACY RISKS ARE GREATEST 
We knew going into this study that court records contain sensitive 
information. Indeed, scholars have long argued that court records raise 
substantial privacy concerns. What we lacked, however, was 
comprehensive data about the extent and context of this information. 
These data are essential to understanding the threats to privacy that court 
records present. 
In Part V, we identified the most common types of sensitive 
information that appear in the North Carolina Supreme Court’s case files. 
In this section we begin to evaluate the potential “harmfulness” of this 
information, based on frequency of appearance, certain document and case 
attributes, and existing legal authority requiring or recommending 
redaction. We note at the outset that “harmfulness” is a contested concept 
in privacy law,226 and we do not take a position in this Article as to how 
“harm” should be defined in the context of public records. Instead, we 
present an assessment of relative risk based on the frequency of occurrence 
and context of a broad range of sensitive information types. Regardless of 
how one defines the harm that comes from the disclosure of certain types 
of sensitive information, the harmfulness of that information will likely be 
influenced by the frequency of disclosure and its context both within court 
records and the larger information ecosystem.  
The following sections highlight our key findings.  
1. Court Records Vary Substantially in the Sensitive Information They 
Contain 
We found that court records vary substantially in both the types and 
frequency of sensitive information they contain. The records we studied 
did not exhibit every type of sensitive information in equal measure. Some 
information appeared much more often than other information. And some 
types of information that privacy advocates have highlighted did not 
appear at all in the records we studied. Moreover, nearly one in ten 
documents in our sample did not contain any of the 140 sensitive 
information types we coded for in this project. 
 
 226. As we noted in Part III, there is considerable disagreement among privacy 
scholars about the nature of the interests that privacy advances. In fact, some scholars 
argue that courts should abandon harm-based rationales entirely when evaluating privacy 
claims. See, e.g., James Peterson, Behind the Curtain of Privacy: How Obscenity Law 
Inhibits the Expression of Ideas About Sex and Gender, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 625, 632 n.38 
(1998) (“In practice, the distinction between harm and offense is not always easy to 
maintain, because extreme forms of offense can cause emotional and even palpable 
physical harm.”). 
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Although it is not surprising that certain types of sensitive information 
appeared more often than others, we were surprised by some of the 
patterns we found. To facilitate the collection and analysis of our data, we 
grouped the various information types into thirteen categories.227 When 
we compared these categories, we found that sensitive information in 
seven categories appeared much more frequently than the other categories 
of information. The most commonly occurring categories—location, 
identity, criminal proceedings, health, assets, financial information, and 
civil proceedings—each appeared in at least 20% of the documents we 
studied; the remaining six categories each appeared in fewer than 8% of 
the documents.228  
Information types in the less frequently appearing categories warrant 
comment because of their unexpected absence in the documents. 
Information about sexual practices appeared infrequently, as did 
information in the intellectual pursuits category, which includes religious 
beliefs, political opinions, and voting and reading records.229 Information 
about education was also mostly absent from the documents as were 
photos and videos. None of the documents contained any sensitive 
information that fell within the computer use category (e.g., user names, 
passwords, and search history).  
We also found substantial variability in how often certain types of 
sensitive information appeared in individual documents. For most of the 
information categories, sensitive information appeared between three and 
six times per document.230 There were outliers, however. Information in 
the criminal proceedings category appeared far more frequently in the 
documents than any other information category, showing up 
approximately nine to eighteen times as often as the other categories.231 
Interestingly, although information in the images and sexual activities 
categories did not appear in very many documents, when it did appear, it 
appeared more often in a document than all the other categories except the 
criminal proceedings category.232 
 
 227. For a description of the categories we utilized, see supra Section III.B. 
 228. See supra Table 4 and accompanying text. 
 229. Intellectual pursuits are a category of information that only recently began to 
receive protection under U.S. privacy laws, but is the subject of an increasing amount of 
privacy scholarship. See supra Section III.B.11. 
 230. See supra Table 4 and accompanying text. 
 231. The “images” category is the other outlier, with a median of seventeen 
appearances per document. See supra Table 4. 
 232. See supra Section V.A.2 and accompanying text. 
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Again, it is just as important to focus on what we did not find in the 
records. The types of information that most people would associate with 
financial fraud and identity theft appeared less often than we expected. 
We found surprisingly few social security numbers, bank account numbers, 
credit card numbers, and other financial account numbers, each of which 
appeared in no more than three documents in our sample of 504 
documents.233 We also found no partial social security numbers, debit card 
numbers, credit reports, or personal identification numbers (PINs) in the 
records.  
Several types of sensitive health information also appeared less 
frequently than we expected. Information about abortion, paternity, and 
communicable diseases each appeared in only one document. Genetic 
information appeared in only three documents, which may be due in part 
to the time period we studied (1984–2000),234 and information about drug 
or alcohol treatment appeared in only four documents. We found no 
references in the documents to an identified individual having HIV or 
AIDS. 
2. Criminal Information Is Pervasive in Court Records 
What we did find in great numbers in the court records was 
information related to criminal proceedings, particularly witness names, 
crime victim names, arrests, criminal charges, and the names of subjects 
under investigation. Indeed, information in the criminal proceedings 
category pervaded the court records we reviewed. It not only appeared in 
most of the documents, it also appeared more often in those documents 
than any other category of sensitive information.  
More than half of the documents we analyzed contained information 
that fell in the criminal proceedings category, and the individual 
information types in this category far outpaced every other type of 
information we coded for in terms of frequency of occurrence. The names 
of witnesses in criminal cases appeared more often than any other 
information type in our data set, followed by the name of an individual 
 
 233. See supra Figure 3 and accompanying text. Although the North Carolina Rules 
of Appellate Procedure do not require that social security numbers be excluded from 
briefs filed in the North Carolina Supreme Court, the rules do state that SSNs “shall be 
deleted or redacted from any document before including the document in the record on 
appeal.” N.C. R. APP. P. 9(a)(4). Our project did not involve the coding of the records on 
appeal.  
 234. See MICHAEL LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH MACHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS 
HISTORY OF DNA FINGERPRINTING 13 (2008) (noting that DNA evidence was first 
used in criminal investigations in the late 1980s but challenges in the courts and scientific 
press slowed its acceptance until the mid-1990s).  
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who was the subject of a criminal investigation. The name of a victim of 
criminal activity other than rape (rape victim name is a separate 
information type) was the third most frequently occurring information 
type, and information about arrests and convictions were the fourth and 
fifth most common information types, respectively.  
Additionally, when information about criminal proceedings appeared 
in a document, it did so in large numbers. As we noted above, for most of 
the information categories sensitive information appeared between three 
and six times per document. By comparison, information in the criminal 
proceedings category appeared more than fifty times per document.235 This 
substantially higher frequency of appearance is not due to a profusion of 
criminal cases. Documents from criminal cases made up only 36% of our 
sample.236 Instead, what we see in the data is that criminal information 
appeared in documents filed in every type of case, including civil and 
juvenile cases. 
Our data cannot tell us why criminal information is so pervasive in 
court records, but we can speculate based on qualitative factors. 
Information types in the criminal proceedings category—and in the civil 
proceedings category as well—relate to the functioning of the court system 
itself,237 so it is perhaps not surprising to find these information types 
throughout the North Carolina Supreme Court’s records. Indeed, when 
we examine the context of information from both of these categories, we 
see that information about the functioning of our criminal and civil courts 
is widely dispersed across all of the document types and case types we 
coded. As we noted, however, our data cannot definitely answer why 
criminal information is so common in court records. We hope that other 
researchers will take up this question.  
3. Criminal Cases Have Disproportionately More Sensitive 
Information 
Although documents from criminal cases constituted only slightly 
more than a third of the sample, they had an outsized impact on the types 
and frequency of sensitive information. More than three quarters (76.3%) 
of the sensitive information came from documents filed in criminal cases. 
 
 235. The criminal category appeared at a median frequency of appearance per 
document of 54.5. See supra Table 4 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra Table 2. 
 237. Briefs filed in appellate courts often include arguments that turn on how the 
justice system functions, including acts and omissions by law enforcement, the credibility 
of witnesses, the relevancy of prior convictions and civil judgments, and the fairness of 
the jury. 
  
2015] PRIVACY AND COURT RECORDS 1885 
And not only did criminal cases contain more sensitive information than 
civil and juvenile cases, they also contained a greater variety of sensitive 
information.  
Criminal cases contained sensitive information from all of the 
categories that we identified in the documents,238 whereas information 
from two categories, education and images, was entirely absent from civil 
cases.239 Overall, criminal cases contained more individual types of 
sensitive information than civil and juvenile cases. Of the 140 sensitive 
information types that we coded for in the records, ninety-five distinct 
types appeared in the documents. Although some types appeared 
exclusively or nearly so in civil cases, documents filed in criminal cases 
contained a greater number of sensitive information types.240  
Criminal cases also had substantially more sensitive information per 
document than either civil or juvenile cases. In fact, the median frequency 
of sensitive information in documents filed in criminal cases was 
approximately five times greater than that of documents filed in either civil 
or juvenile cases.241 As a result, criminal cases had a higher density of 
sensitive information per page than either civil or juvenile cases. As page 
length increased, the number of pieces of sensitive information in criminal 
cases increased at a higher rate than it did in civil and juvenile cases. For 
criminal cases, the ratio between page length and frequency of sensitive 
information was four times greater than that of civil and juvenile cases. 
One of the drivers of this disparity may be the disproportionate impact 
of death penalty cases.242 Although documents from death penalty cases 
constituted only 6.5% of our sample,243 they contained more than a quarter 
 
 238. We did not find any information in the documents that fell within the 
“computer use” category. See supra Table 4. 
 239. Six of the thirteen information categories were absent from documents filed in 
juvenile cases. 
 240. See supra Table 5 and accompanying text. 
 241. Sensitive information in criminal cases also appeared much more frequently in 
the brief body than in the appendix. See supra Figure 2. 
 242. During the period from 1989–1998, there was a sharp increase in the number of 
documents from cases in which a defendant was sentenced to death (from 0.8 documents 
per year to 2.7 per year). This corresponded to an increase in death penalty verdicts in 
North Carolina, which rose from nine in 1989 to thirty-four in 1995. CTR. FOR DEATH 
PENALTY LITIG., ON TRIAL FOR THEIR LIVES: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF WRONGFUL 
PROSECUTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA 16 (2015), http://www.cdpl.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/06/INTERACTIVE-CDPL-REPORT.pdf. In North Carolina, death 
penalty convictions are subject to automatic review by the North Carolina Supreme 
Court. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2000(d)(1) (West 2015). 
 243. The most commonly occurring appellate subject area was “tort, contract, and 
real property,” which constituted 32% of the documents in the sample, followed by 
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(27.7%) of the total amount of sensitive information. Documents from 
death penalty cases also were, on average, the longest documents in the 
sample.244 Interestingly, most of the appearances of sensitive information 
types in the education category occurred in documents filed in death 
penalty cases, whereas information types in the employment and financial 
categories were largely absent from documents filed in these cases.245  
4. Minors Deserve Additional Attention 
The vast majority of the sensitive information was associated with 
adults. Nevertheless, because of heightened concerns about the privacy of 
children, information associated with minors deserves special attention.246 
As the data showed, sensitive information about minors was not 
limited to juvenile cases. Overall, 7% of the sensitive information was 
associated with an identified minor. Criminal cases evidenced slightly 
more information associated with minors than civil cases, but the 
difference was not substantial.247 Not surprisingly, juvenile cases contained 
significantly more information about minors: 40% of the sensitive 
information in juvenile cases was associated with a minor.248  
 
“felony (non-death penalty),” which arose in 26% of the documents. See supra notes 180–
181 and accompanying text.  
 244. Documents filed in death penalty cases had a mean length of 113.63 pages, 
more than twice the average length for all documents in the sample (sample mean was 
47.92 pages). 
 245. The higher frequency of appearance of information relating to education in 
death penalty cases may be due to its relevance as mitigation evidence. See N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e). Documents in death penalty cases also had the highest 
incidences of the following sensitive information types: “Criminal Sentence,” 
“Incarceration,” “Juror Names,” and “Student Discipline.”  
 246. Some commentators have argued that all juvenile proceedings should be closed 
by default in order to protect the interests of minors. See, e.g., William Wesley Patton & 
Kelly Crecco, An Update to Striking a Balance: Freedom of the Press Versus Children’s Privacy 
Interests in Juvenile Dependency Proceedings, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 575, 589 (2014) 
(“Children are at much more risk of juragenic psychological harm in a presumptively 
open dependency court system than in a discretionarily open court system for a number of 
reasons.”); see also Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: 
Retributive Versus Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1158–60 
(2009) (suggesting there can be tensions between victim rights and the confidentiality of 
juvenile prosecutions). 
 247. Sensitive information in criminal cases was associated with minors 7.2% of the 
time. In civil cases it was 6.1%. 
 248. See supra Section V.B.2.b. Although we did not record whether the minor in 
question was a “covered juvenile” under North Carolina law and thus entitled to 
additional privacy protections, a recent study published by the Juvenile Law Center found 
that the vast majority of states—including North Carolina—are failing to protect highly 
sensitive information contained in juvenile court records. JUVENILE LAW CTR., FAILED 
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Although the overall amount of information associated with minors 
was low, there were some notable differences between the information 
categories with regard to minors. Relative to their baseline percentage 
across all categories, minors were less likely to be associated with 
information relating to criminal proceedings and more likely to be 
associated with information in the education, health, identity, and sexual 
activities categories.249 In addition, a number of specific information types 
were disproportionately associated with minors. Information about 
“Communicable Disease” and, unsurprisingly, “Name of Minor Child,” 
for example, were exclusively identified with minors,250 and several 
information types associated with both adults and minors appeared more 
often with minors than the overall percentages would have suggested, 
including: “Adoption,” “Custody or Guardianship,” “Date of Birth,” 
“Juvenile Court History,” “Pregnancy,” and “Sex Life.”  
On the other hand, there were several information types we expected 
to find associated with minors more often than we observed. For instance, 
no photographs or videos were associated with minors. Information about 
“Student Discipline” appeared in only one document, and “Student 
Grades and Performance Evaluations” appeared in only six documents. 
Given the small number of documents from juvenile cases in the 
sample (n = 7), the inferences regarding the extent of sensitive information 
associated with minors is limited, especially in juvenile cases. A larger 
sample of documents from juvenile cases is necessary to better understand 
the privacy risks associated with minors. This is also an area we hope 
future researchers will explore. 
5. It Is Unwise to Focus Exclusively on Appendices 
When we began this study we assumed, based largely on anecdotal 
reports from archivists and privacy scholars, that appendices included in 
court records would contain more sensitive information than legal briefs 
and that highly sensitive information that had been kept out of legal briefs 
would nevertheless appear in the appendices. Our study showed, however, 
that appendices are for the most part not quantitatively different from 
 
POLICIES, FORFEITED FUTURES: A NATIONWIDE SCORECARD ON JUVENILE 
RECORDS (2015), http://jlc.org/blog/new-study-reveals-majority-us-states-fail-protect
-juvenile-records. 
 249. See supra Section V.B.2.b. 
 250. Information concerning “Communicable Disease” appeared only once in the 
sample. As noted in Part III, we coded for “Name of Minor Child” as a specific 
information type; this was the most common information type associated with minors. 
See supra Section V.B.2.b, especially Figure 7. 
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legal briefs in terms of the frequency and types of sensitive information 
they contain.  
In terms of the amount of sensitive information in a document, the 
data actually showed that legal briefs contained a higher frequency of 
sensitive information than appendices. This disparity was particularly 
evident in criminal and juvenile cases, where the brief bodies contained 
approximately three times as much sensitive information as the 
appendices; for civil cases, sensitive information appeared with equal 
frequency in the appendices and briefs.251 These findings were reinforced 
by the multiple regression model, which showed that a document’s 
inclusion of an appendix did not affect the total amount of sensitive 
information in the document.252  
With regard to the specific types of sensitive information in briefs and 
appendices, the results were more mixed. Only seven of the ninety-five 
information types that we identified in the records appeared more often in 
the appendices.253 On the other hand, twenty-seven information types 
appeared exclusively in the briefs, and many more appeared more than 
50% of the time in the briefs. Nevertheless, the information types that did 
appear more often in the appendices were the types of information many 
would regard as particularly sensitive from the standpoint of identity theft. 
Uniquely identifying physical characteristics, drivers’ license numbers, 
social security numbers, and state identification numbers all appeared 
more often in the appendices, with the latter three information types 
appearing exclusively in an appendix.  
Accordingly, although there is good reason to pay careful attention to 
appendices when reviewing court records for sensitive information, it is 
unwise to focus exclusively on appendices. More types of sensitive 
information appear in legal briefs, and at a higher overall frequency than in 
appendices. 
6. Trends in Sensitive Information over Time 
Although the amount of sensitive information in the case files of the 
North Carolina Supreme Court varied significantly during the time period 
of this study (1984–2000), there were no overarching trends in the 
frequency of sensitive information during this seventeen-year period.254 
 
 251. See supra Figure 2 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra Section V.B.4. 
 253. See supra Figure 8 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra Figure 10 and accompanying text. 
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Instead, the most commonly occurring information types appeared with a 
frequency that varied within a relatively consistent range. 
This is not to say that the amount of sensitive information was 
constant during this time period. To the contrary, there was a great deal of 
year-to-year variability. In some years there were sharp increases in the 
amount of sensitive information while in other years there were steep 
declines. Moreover, the various categories of information did not rise and 
fall together. 
Nevertheless, these variations, which appear to be cyclical, do not show 
a declining or rising trend during the time period under study. Whether 
this would continue to be the case if we extended our collection of court 
records earlier or later in time is beyond the scope of this study. 
A number of important events occurred in the late 1990s and early 
2000s that might have a significant impact on the frequency and extent of 
sensitive information in court records in the years following our study. In 
1999, the North Carolina court system began allowing electronic filing 
and in 2009 implement e-filing rules that placed the onus on the parties to 
redact a number of types of sensitive information from case filings, 
including social security numbers and certain financial information.255 In 
addition, in the late 1990s there was a significant rise in the use of 
computers and electronic communication systems that might have led to 
the generation of different types of sensitive information in court records. 
Given the time it takes for a case to work its way up to a state’s highest 
court, we can expect that these changes would likely take a few years to be 
reflected in the North Carolina Supreme Court’s files. 
B.  CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING PRIVACY PROTECTIVE 
PRACTICES 
In addition to aiding our understanding of privacy in the context of 
court records, the results of this research and the experience of the coders 
will have practical implications for court personnel and archivists as they 
develop rules and practices for electronic filing of court records or the 
digitization of older records. Although all of our findings should have 
some bearing on these efforts, we highlight four main points. 
First, some types of sensitive information are easier to identify in court 
records than others. If courts or archivists decide to limit access to certain 
 
 255. See generally Deborah Leonard Parker, Electronic Filing in North Carolina, 2 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 351 (2000) (describing the impact of the introduction of 
electronic filing rules in North Carolina in 1999). See also supra note 10 and 
accompanying text. 
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types of sensitive information, they will inevitably have to make choices 
about which information types should be restricted based, at least in part, 
on whether the burden of addressing privacy is commensurate with the 
risk of harm and whether investments in privacy protection practices will 
be effective. Such proportionality considerations get to the heart of the 
debate about the nature of privacy harms and the risks, both foreseeable 
and perhaps unforeseeable, that are presented by current and future 
practices of information aggregation and use. Without solving the 
normative and broader practical problems, though, this study nonetheless 
reveals that some of the sensitive information types in court records appear 
in standard formats—such as social security numbers, dates of birth, and 
financial account numbers—and therefore are more easily identifiable 
through automated searching techniques.256  
Second, many sensitive information types require human readers to 
review records more than once in order to identify the information. Our 
coders reported that some sensitive information was identifiable only by 
reading the record and developing a sense of the narrative. For example, 
the first mention of an individual might not reveal that she was indeed a 
cooperating defendant or that a particular named person was a minor. 
This type of information would likely require a human reader to review 
the record and make note of names associated with sensitive information. 
Coders also reported that reading a document once would not necessarily 
be sufficient to capture all occurrences of names that could be associated 
with sensitive information. Even after this investment of human effort, the 
question remains about how best to balance privacy and judicial 
transparency if the sensitive information arises through the course of the 
narrative. The name itself might be amenable to redaction, but the story of 
cooperation might be too interwoven in a brief or appendix to make 
redaction feasible.  
Third, redaction may be a poor strategy for dealing with some sensitive 
information types. Our coders reported that some court briefs and 
 
 256. See Rebecca Green, Petitions, Privacy, and Political Obscurity, 85 TEMP. L. REV 
367, 406 n.272 (2013) (noting that courts and judicial administrators have explored 
redaction using computer software, but also noting the prevalence of redaction errors in 
the federal court records PACER database); Ronald Leighton, Joe Cecil, Michael 
Ishakian & Edward Felten, Panel Three: Implementation—What Methods, If Any, Can be 
Employed to Promote the Existing Rules’ Attempts to Protect Private Identifier Information 
from Internet Access? 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 45, 49 (2010) (Felten discusses the 
amenability of social security numbers to software redaction because of their fixed pattern 
and suggests that advanced machine learning methods could be developed to help locate 
and redact even “difficult types of information, such as names of minor children.”). 
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accompanying appendices revealed information that was difficult to code 
as a discrete occurrence. The story of child abuse, for example, might 
pervade a particular case record. Options for addressing privacy would 
need to account for this challenge. The preliminary coding also revealed 
that the occurrence of language conveying a person’s gender is a poor fit 
for redaction because gender is so integral to the English language. As 
explained in Part III, the coding for gender threatened to overwhelm the 
coding process, and the same would be true for any redaction effort.  
Fourth, the data showed that there might be some value in prioritizing 
the review of certain documents when searching for sensitive information 
in appellate court records. We found that the various brief types were not 
all equal in the amount of sensitive information they contained. For 
example, briefs filed by the state had the highest frequency of sensitive 
information, whereas amicus briefs had the fewest appearances of sensitive 
information.257 In addition, documents filed in death penalty cases had a 
disproportionately higher rate of sensitive information than other types of 
cases. For court personnel and archivists seeking to make the best use of 
limited resources, it may make sense to focus on some types of documents 
and cases over others. We would caution, however, against focusing 
exclusively on appendices.258 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Court records present a special challenge for privacy advocates. Unlike 
in many other areas of privacy law, the information in court records is 
presumptively open to the public. This openness serves many salutary 
functions, such as ensuring that our system of justice functions fairly and is 
accountable to the public. The public’s right of access to court records and 
the information they contain, however, is not absolute. 
Courts can—and frequently do—restrict public access when an 
overriding interest supports closure or sealing of specific information. 
Although the precise standard that a court must apply will vary depending 
on the circumstances, in general courts must conclude that the interest in 
prohibiting disclosure outweighs the strong presumption of public access. 
In the context of libraries and other archives, which may not be bound by 
 
 257. Briefs filed by the state had a median of 105.5 appearances of sensitive 
information per document; for amicus briefs, the median was 10.5. See supra Table 3. 
Multiple regression modeling also showed that the brief types (other than amicus briefs) 
were statistically significant predictors of the amount of sensitive information in a 
document. 
 258. See supra Section VI.A.5. 
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law to provide public access to court records, the question is not about 
what the law requires but about what policy best ensures the protection of 
privacy interests while simultaneously informing the public about the 
functioning of the court system. 
Although we found a substantial amount of sensitive information in 
the court records we studied, we have not sought to tell courts or archivists 
what information, if any, should be redacted or what documents should be 
withheld from online access or otherwise managed for privacy protection. 
These largely normative questions must be answered based on a careful 
balancing of the competing public access and privacy interests. The data 
presented in this study will be helpful in this balancing, but the findings 
should not be read to dictate one approach or another. 
Privacy interests cannot be evaluated based solely on the presence or 
absence of specific types of sensitive information in a single court 
document. Other factors, including the context of the information and the 
extent of information about an individual that is available from other 
sources, must also be taken into account. On that latter point, this study is 
but one piece in a complicated mosaic. 
What this study has shown is that court records vary significantly in 
the types of sensitive information they contain. Records in civil cases are 
not identical to records in criminal cases or juvenile cases. Consequently, 
when scholars and policymakers discuss privacy and court records, they 
must be cautious of generalizing. Depending on the privacy concerns 
considered paramount, we are likely to see a very different risk profile 
between different types of court records, cases, and levels of the court 
system. 
Much work remains in order to understand the privacy risks that 
might arise from online access to court records. We hope that future 
researchers will answer some of the questions that the data have raised, 
including the prevalence of criminal information in court records, the 
differences between appellate court records and trial court records, the 
extent of sensitive information in juvenile court files, and the impact of e-
filing procedures on the types and frequency of sensitive information in 
court records. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Sensitive information types in coding list, with category and number of 
documents that contained each information type, percentage of the total sample of 
documents (n = 504), overall frequency of appearance, and percentage of total frequency 
of all sensitive information identified in the sample. 
 Documents Frequency 
Sensitive Information Type Category n % n % 
Abortion Health 1 0.2% 1 0.0% 
Adoption Civil Proceedings 4 0.8% 114 0.2% 
Age Identity 84 16.7% 350 0.7% 
Arrest or Charge Criminal Proceedings 160 31.7% 2,512 4.7% 
Asset-Other Assets 3 0.6% 6 0.0% 
Bank Account Number Financial 3 0.6% 9 0.0% 
Bankruptcy Financial 4 0.8% 10 0.0% 
Cable Television Subscription Record Intellectual Pursuits 1 0.2% 4 0.0% 
Cable Television Viewing History Intellectual Pursuits 0 - 0 - 
Cause of Death Health 70 13.9% 174 0.3% 
Child Abuse Criminal Proceedings 27 5.4% 378 0.7% 
Child Support Civil Proceedings 11 2.2% 40 0.1% 
Civil Commitment Civil Proceedings 3 0.6% 27 0.1% 
Civil Proceedings-Other Civil Proceedings 2 0.4% 5 0.0% 
Communicable Disease Health 1 0.2% 1 0.0% 
Compensation Financial 125 24.8% 909 1.7% 
Computer Use - Other Computer Use 0 - 0 - 
Content of Recorded Conversations Intellectual Pursuits 3 0.6% 119 0.2% 
Conviction Criminal Proceedings 150 29.8% 1,744 3.3% 
Cooperating Defendant Name Criminal Proceedings 32 6.3% 772 1.5% 
Credit Card Number Financial 1 0.2% 2 0.0% 
Credit Report Financial 0 - 0 - 
Criminal Proceedings-Other Criminal Proceedings 17 3.4% 257 0.5% 
Custody or Guardianship Civil Proceedings 17 3.4% 257 0.5% 
Date of Birth Identity 30 6.0% 46 0.1% 
Date of Death Identity 85 16.9% 325 0.6% 
Date of Hospital Stay Health 37 7.3% 115 0.2% 
Debit Card Number Financial 0 - 0 - 
Debt Financial 7 1.4% 47 0.1% 
Dependency or Neglect Civil Proceedings 2 0.4% 15 0.0% 
Disability Status Health 24 4.8% 136 0.3% 
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 Documents Frequency 
Sensitive Information Type Category n % n % 
Discipline Employment 20 4.0% 237 0.5% 
Divorce Civil Proceedings 35 6.9% 200 0.4% 
Domestic Violence Victim Name Criminal Proceedings 7 1.4% 525 1.0% 
Driver’s License Number Identity 2 0.4% 6 0.0% 
Drug or Alcohol Dependency Health 34 6.7% 325 0.6% 
Drug or Alcohol Treatment Health 4 0.8% 6 0.0% 
Drug or Alcohol Use Health 8 1.6% 135 0.3% 
Education-Other Education 1 0.2% 4 0.0% 
Eligibility for School Lunch Program Education 0 - 0 - 
Email Address Identity 0 - 0 - 
Employment-Other Employment 0 - 0 - 
Fax Number Identity 0 - 0 - 
Financial Aid Award Education 0 - 0 - 
Financial Asset Assets 74 14.7% 492 0.9% 
Financial-Other Financial 5 1.0% 11 0.0% 
Fingerprint Identity 0 - 0 - 
Foreclosure Judgment Financial 6 1.2% 81 0.2% 
Full-Face Photograph Images 1 0.2% 2 0.0% 
Gait Identity 0 - 0 - 
Gender Identity Change Identity 0 - 0 - 
Genetic Information Health 3 0.6% 8 0.0% 
Geolocation Information Location 52 10.3% 301 0.6% 
Gun Permit Assets 0 - 0 - 
Gun Permit Application Assets 0 - 0 - 
Gun Possession or Ownership Assets 65 12.9% 781 1.5% 
Health Plan Beneficiary Number Health 0 - 0 - 
Health-Other Health 65 12.9% 781 1.5% 
HIV / AIDS Status Health 0 - 0 - 
Home Address Location 55 10.9% 216 0.4% 
Identity-Other Identity 13 2.6% 32 0.1% 
IM ID Computer Use 0 - 0 - 
Images-Other Images 0 - 0 - 
Incarceration Criminal Proceedings 49 9.7% 295 0.6% 
Informant Name Criminal Proceedings 4 0.8% 290 0.6% 
Insurance Policy Number Financial 5 1.0% 14 0.0% 
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 Documents Frequency 
Sensitive Information Type Category n % n % 
Intellectual Pursuits-Other Intellectual Pursuits 1 0.2% 1 0.0% 
Internet Protocol (IP) Address Computer Use 0 - 0 - 
Internet Search History Computer Use 0 - 0 - 
ISP Records Computer Use 0 - 0 - 
Iris Print Identity 0 - 0 - 
Juror Name Criminal/Civil Proceedings 35 6.9% 1,563 3.0% 
Juvenile Court History Criminal Proceedings 4 0.8% 19 0.0% 
Loan Account Number Financial 0 - 0 - 
Location-Other Location 101 20.0% 1,122 2.1% 
Medical Billing Number Health 0 - 0 - 
Medical Condition Health 101 20.0% 1,122 2.1% 
Medical Device ID/Serial Number Health 0 - 0 - 
Medical Record Number Health 0 - 0 - 
Military Discharge Employment 8 1.6% 11 0.0% 
Mother’s Maiden Name Identity 5 1.0% 9 0.0% 
Mug Shot Criminal Proceedings 0 - 0 - 
Name of Minor Child Identity 85 16.9% 1,581 3.0% 
Name of Subject of Investigation Criminal Proceedings 173 34.3% 8,284 15.6% 
Other Crime Victim Name Criminal Proceedings 136 27.0% 4,988 9.4% 
Other Financial Account Number Financial 2 0.4% 4 0.0% 
Other Health Diagnosis or Treatment Health 99 19.6% 1,397 2.6% 
Parole Status Criminal Proceedings 5 1.0% 24 0.1% 
Passport Number Identity 0 - 0 - 
Password Computer Use 0 - 0 - 
Paternity Test Health 1 0.2% 1 0.0% 
Performance Evaluation Employment 16 3.2% 59 0.1% 
Personal Identification 
Code/Password Financial 0 - 0 - 
Photos/Videos - Fully Undressed Images 0 - 0 - 
Photos/Videos - Partially Undressed Images 0 - 0 - 
Photos/Videos -Violence, Abuse, 
Death Images 1 0.2% 15 0.0% 
Place of Birth Identity 6 1.2% 7 0.0% 
Place of Death Health 28 5.6% 41 0.1% 
Political Opinion Intellectual Pursuits 2 0.4% 9 0.0% 
Pregnancy Health 14 2.8% 56 0.1% 
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 Documents Frequency 
Sensitive Information Type Category n % n % 
Prescriptions Health 7 1.4% 17 0.0% 
Presentence Investigation Report Criminal Proceedings 1 0.2% 1 0.0% 
Prior Civil Judgment Civil Proceedings 60 11.9% 528 1.0% 
Professional Cert. or License Number Identity 29 5.8% 76 0.1% 
Racial or Ethnic Origin Identity 19 3.8% 175 0.3% 
Rape Victim Name Criminal Proceedings 43 8.5% 1,121 2.1% 
Real Estate Ownership/Rental Assets 82 16.3% 1,103 2.1% 
Records of Library Use Intellectual Pursuits 0 - 0 - 
Records of Reading Material Intellectual Pursuits 3 0.6% 5 0.0% 
Religious or Philosophical Belief Intellectual Pursuits 16 3.2% 172 0.3% 
RFID Computer Use 0 - 0 - 
School Address Location 0 - 0 - 
Sentence Criminal Proceedings 3 0.6% 5 0.0% 
Sex Life Sexual Activities 16 3.2% 172 0.3% 
Sex Video Sexual Activities 0 - 0 - 
Sexual Abuse Allegation Criminal Proceedings 3 0.6% 12 0.0% 
Sexual Activities-Other Sexual Activities 129 25.6% 776 1.5% 
Signature Identity 0 - 0 - 
SSN - Full Identity 1 0.2% 1 0.0% 
SSN - Partial Identity 0 - 0 - 
State ID Number Identity 1 0.2% 1 0.0% 
Student Discipline Education 1 0.2% 1 0.0% 
Student Grades or Performance Evals. Education 6 1.2% 16 0.0% 
Student ID Education 0 - 0 - 
Tax Lien Financial 5 1.0% 5 0.0% 
Tax Return Financial 1 0.2% 5 0.0% 
Telephone Number Identity 231 45.8% 570 1.1% 
Trade Union Membership Intellectual Pursuits 0 - 0 - 
Unique Physical Characteristic Identity 5 1.0% 27 0.1% 
User Name Computer Use 0 - 0 - 
Vehicle Identification Number Assets 0 - 0 - 
Vehicle License Plate Number Assets 2 0.4% 3 0.0% 
Victim of Identity Theft Financial 0 - 0 - 
Video Rental Records Intellectual Pursuits 1 0.2% 1 0.0% 
Voice Print Identity 0 - 0 - 
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 Documents Frequency 
Sensitive Information Type Category n % n % 
VOIP ID Computer Use 0 - 0 - 
Voting Record Intellectual Pursuits 1 0.2% 2 0.0% 
Witness Name Criminal/Civil Proceedings 221 43.8% 14,437 27.2% 
Work Address Location 253 50.2% 752 1.4% 
Zip Code Location 202 40.1% 853 1.6% 
 
Table A2: Regression results for the analysis of sensitive information  
per document (log transformed). 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Criminal Case Type 1.552622* 0.1512302
Juvenile Case Type 0.3569533 0.4766879
Amicus Curiae Brief 1.185187 0.9326415
Appellant’s Brief 2.32089* 0.8866871
Appellee’s Brief  1.920483* 0.8927833
Petition for Discretionary Review 1.951337* 0.8965791
Brief for the State 2.237307* 0.8981081
Appendix Present 0.0542404 0.1371782
Document Length (in pages) 0.0109019* 0.0011283
Constant 0.2973103 0.8927754
 
R-squared 0.4626
No. of observations 467
* indicates statistical significance (P < 0.05)
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